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TO THE
O B S E R V A T I O N S
O F
Lict. Gen. Sir WILLIAM HOWE,

ON A PAMPHLET, ENTITLED
LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN:

IN WHICH
MISREPRESENTATIONS are detected, and those
LETTERS are supported, by a Variety of New Matter
and Argument.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,
A N A P P E N D I X,
C O N T A I N I N G,

- I A Letter to Sir WILLIAM HOWE upon his Strictures
on Mr. GALLOWAY's private Character.
- II A Letter from Mr. KIRK to Sir WILLIAM HOWE, and
his Answer.
- III A Letter from a Committee. to the President, of the Con-
gress, on the State of the Rebel Army at Valley Forge,
found among the Papers of HENRY LAURENS, Esq.

By the Author of LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN.

Audi alteram partem.

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R E P L Y

T O

Sir William Howe's Observations, &c.

WHEN a man, conscious of his own misconduct, or at least lying under the charge of having betrayed a public trust, a trust of as great importance as was ever committed to any subject, finds himself under the necessity of misrepresenting notorious facts, and even of descending to personal detraction, for his own vindication, he is truly to be pitied. This appears to be the case of the late Commander in Chief of his Majesty's Forces in America. If the Author of the "Letters to a Nobleman" has contributed to the distress of the General, he has done it with reluctance, from a regard to truth and justice, and a sense of duty to

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the public, and not from any impulse of private resentment; for he frankly declares, he never had any cause of personal enmity to Sir William Howe, who neither had personally injured nor offended him; and therefore, that the motives which led him to publish his strictures on the conduct of the American war, could not arise from such a principle. He considered him only in his public capacity, and, imagining that he could throw new light on a subject which appeared to many to be dark and problematical, and in which the public welfare was intimately concerned, he proceeded to animadvert upon his conduct as Commander in Chief.

Nor was the examination of the management of the American war needlessly undertaken. The unparalleled failures in that war, the uncommon magnitude of the evils in which they had involved the nation, with the reluctance of Government to make judicial enquiry into the causes of them, loudly called for it.

We had seen the General, in the Middle Colonies, commanding a force always, commonly four times, and at certain periods eight times, greater than that of his enemy; a force so powerful, so adequate to the purposes for which it was intended, that he could not help expressing his "utter amazement" on the occasion, and paying to the Secretary of State of the American department the greatest, though not more than a just encomium,
for

for his “ uncommon exertions.” To this was added a naval force of eighty vessels of war, under the command of his Noble Brother, to co-operate with him in subduing the most unnatural and unjustifiable rebellion *that ever happened in any country.*

We had seen him, between the 3d of September and the 8th of December, driving that enemy before him from Long Island, over the North River, and the Delaware, killing, captivating, and reducing his army from 18,000 to 3000 men, and taking from him *the whole province of New Jersey.*

But such was the reverse of conduct (it could not be of fortune; for fortune, however variable and frolic, has never yet been found to commit such blunders), such was the dereliction of military virtue, that he suffered that reduced, panic-struck enemy to surprise his advanced post, and drive him out of West Jersey, and to reconquer all East Jersey, except his three posts on the Rariton; and, established at Morris Town, in the neighbourhood of his head-quarters, to besiege, harass, and distress the whole British army, from December to June, *without making one attempt to dislodge him.*

We had seen him, having under his command at New-York 30,000 men, marching out against this enemy, who, by his own exaggerated account, had no more than 10,000, new-raised and undif-

ciplined; and, a few days after, shamefully retreating before him from Hillsborough to Amboy, without taking any *one proper step to bring him to an engagement.*

We had seen him, after this disgraceful retreat, embarking his army on ship-board, at an immense expence to the nation; and, forewarned of the difficulties and dangers he must necessarily encounter on the ocean, proceeding, against contrary winds, 700 miles, to meet the same enemy posted on stronger ground, and enabling him, by this waste of time, to procure *near double his former numbers.*

We had seen him, contrary to the most urgent motives, to the plainest dictates of military science, and the explicit orders of his Sovereign, lead his force 600 miles from the place where he was directed to join General Burgoyne, and at the very time when that junction was to have been made; and by this absurd conduct *sacrifice a whole British army.*

We had seen him at Brandywine, by the most judicious and spirited manœuvres, perfectly surround and hem in, between the two columns of his own force and impassable waters, the whole rebel army, vigorously attack, and suddenly defeat it; and yet, with an indolence not to be justified, he suffered the defeated remains to lie a whole night at Chester, within eight miles of his camp, *and on the next morning to escape unmolesed.*

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We had seen him at Goshen a few days after, when his enemy, with his reduced force, had incautiously and foolishly advanced near the van of his army, after one of his columns had actually "engaged with the rebel advanced guard*," intimidated from his intended attack by a fall of *rain*, although that circumstance was much more favourable to his own regular troops than to the undisciplined troops of his enemy; and although *that enemy had a considerable river in its rear.*

We had seen him at Germantown suffer himself to be surpris'd, his advanced posts defeated and driven back upon the main body of his army, and that army in imminent danger of a total rout *by an inferior undisciplined enemy.*

We had seen him, when the rebel force lay at White Marsh, and when he actually had the best information of its position and strength, march out of his lines under a pretence of intending to attack it; and yet, after lying three days within two miles of it, return, without attempting to bring it to action, either by assault, or turning its right flank or rear; in either of which cases he must have cut his enemy off from his magazines and supplies, and placed him in a situation from whence *he could not have escaped without ruin.*

We had also seen the General, after he had proved his force in every action superior to that of

* See Sir William Howe's Letter.

his enemy, suffer his whole army to be besieged in Philadelphia, from the month of November to the month of June, *by a feeble, sickly, naked, and half-starved army, of less than 4000 effective men* *.

But further.—We had seen the same General, with a vanity and presumption unparalleled in history, after this indolence, after all these wretched blunders, accept, from a few of his officers, a triumph more magnificent than would have become the conqueror of America, without the consent of his Sovereign, or approbation of his country; and that at the time when the news of a war with France had just arrived, and in the very city, the capital of North America, the late seat of the Congress, which was in a few days to be delivered up to that Congress.

Such was the disgraceful conduct, such the presumption of the General, and such were the misfortunes which he had brought on his country! And yet, had he contented himself with the honours he had received from this mockery of a triumph, he might have pleased himself with dreaming of his triumphal arches, decorated with the mottoes of victory and the emblems of glory, and with his Quixotic tilts and tournaments, and the “Letters to a Nobleman” would never have appeared. But when the Author saw the General

* See a Letter in the Appendix, from a Committee to the President of the Congress.

and his Noble Brother, supported by a dangerous faction, pursuing measures which he conceived tended to involve his country in disgrace and ruin; when he saw them, in order to conceal their own misconduct, attempting to persuade the great representative body of the nation, that America was “the strongest country in the world*,” and impracticable in war; that the people were universally disloyal; that the immense naval and military force committed to their command was incompetent to the reduction of the rebellion—in order to prevail on the nation to give up the greatest part of its dominions; the duties of a citizen, a disinterested regard for the welfare of his country, and an honest indignation at so flagitious an attempt, called on him to lay before his fellow-subjects a true state of the matters thus attempted to be misrepresented. Such were his motives, divested of every other consideration; and he declares, that the Letters were wrote without the solicitation or knowledge of any person whatever in the administration of Government.

Had the General, by a true state of facts, and by candid argument, free from personal abuse, convinced me that I was wrong; ever happy to acquit injured innocence, there is no concession, no act of justice, which my honour would not induce me to perform; but as the reverse is the

* See General Grey's Evidence in the Narrative, p. 107.

case, the same motives which influenced me to write the Letters, oblige me to vindicate the truths they contain.

In my first letter, "On the Strength and Practicability of the Middle Colonies in respect to military Operations," in order to refute what the General had attempted to prove, that this part of America was the "strongest of all countries in the world," I have given a true and candid description of that country, supported by the evidence of General Robertson, who had resided in it many years, and which can be supported by many gentlemen, now in England, who have lived in it; and I had further made a comparison between it and the scene of action in the last American war, shewing that the latter was infinitely more difficult than the former. To evade the force of these truths, the General observes,

Narrative, p. 37.] "*That the two last wars, with respect to the state of the country of America, are in no degree similar. In the last war, the difficulties arising from the strength of the country, were, for the most part, removed by the friendly disposition of the inhabitants, who all exerted themselves to facilitate the operations of the King's army, and to supply them with every necessary and accommodation.*"

What these "necessaries and accommodations" were, which were thus furnished in the last war, and which the General could not procure, is

not mentioned. That the inhabitants furnished General Braddock in his expedition to the Ohio, Colonel Bouquet in his expedition to Muskingum, far beyond the Ohio, and Sir Jeffery Amherst in his expedition to Montreal, with carriages and provisions, is true—and with nothing else—They wanted nothing else. But Sir William Howe did not even want all these.—He transported carriages with him from England, and whatever more he wanted were procured on Long Island and Staten Island. Large fleets of provisions were constantly sent to him; and in every part of the country; where his army marched, he procured a supply without difficulty. At Bordentown, Captain Gamble was forming a large magazine of provisions voluntarily, and with every apparent mark of zeal for the service, brought in by the inhabitants when Trenton was taken; and the whole army was supplied, during two months, in its march from the Elk to Philadelphia, with more provisions than it could consume: and there was nothing which the country produced, either of necessaries or delicacies, during the nine months it remained in Philadelphia, with which it was not furnished by the inhabitants.

What then were the advantages which the Generals in the last war possessed, that were not to be commanded in the present? There were none. But they had disadvantages and difficulties, infinitely greater to encounter, which their gallantry

easily overcame. The General's operations were carried on in the Middle Colonies, where every necessary was easily obtained ; but the expedition of Sir Jeffery Amherst led him to pass from Albany, by Lake Ontario, to Montreal, near 300 miles, carrying his provisions either through a wilderness or an enemy's country, over lakes, mountains, and swamps ; and the operations of General Forbes and Colonel Bouquet led them through a wilderness inhabited only by Indians, where no single article of provisions of any kind was to be procured ; the first to Fort du Quesne, and the other far beyond it, down to Muskingum ; and yet we have found that these gallant men, in whose hearts the honour of their Sovereign and the service of their country were deeply impressed, were not obstructed or intimidated in the path to glory and success by these difficulties.

To refute my assertion, that " the strength and
 " impracticability of the Middle Colonies is lost in
 " idea, when we compare them with the scene of
 " action in the last war," the General adduces the testimony of Major-general Grey, who says,

Page 38.] " *That part of America where I have
 " been, is the strongest country I have ever been in ; it
 " is every where HILLY and COVERED WITH WOOD,
 " intersected by ravines, and creeks, and marshy
 " grounds ; and in EVERY QUARTER OF A MILE is
 " a post fitted for AMBUSCADE.*" And in his answer to
 another question, he adds, " That America is, of
 " all

“ all countries, the best calculated for the defensive ; *every hundred yards* might be disputed ; at least that part of it which I have seen.”

This is a formidable description of the Middle Colonies, and well calculated to furnish the reader with apologies for the want of success in the American war : but it is truly visionary. What countries the Major-general alludes to, I know not ; and yet to prove that he is mistaken in his facts, will be no arduous task. He has seen the plains on Long Island, of thirty miles in length, and from seven to twelve in breadth, which are without wood, or a single obstruction that can give one enemy the advantage over another. He has also seen the country between New-York and Trenton, and between the head of Elk and Philadelphia, in which there is not a hill but what may be either ascended without difficulty, or avoided by an army in its march. And when these hills are compared with those of this country, they are by no means so high, so steep, or so difficult of access ; but when we compare them with the country from Albany to Montreal, and with Conigocheague Ridge, Sideling Hill, Ray’s Hill, the Allegheny and Laurel ridge of mountains, which may be justly styled the American Alps, they are little more than mole-hills ; and yet these mountains, though full of ravines and dangerous defiles, and although covered with

wood, and possessed by an enemy whose talent in war is *ambuscade*, did not intimidate the bravery, nor obstruct the march, of an Amherst, a Forbes, or a Bouquet; they saw them with contempt, and passed them in despite of their opposing enemy.

If the country which the General has seen is *every where covered with wood*, where do those immense quantities of wheat, rye, barley, Indian corn, oats, and buck-wheat, which furnish the inhabitants with food, and are exported to Europe, find room to grow? Is it possible that a country, settled one hundred years, and having so many hundred thousands of industrious inhabitants in it, can in any degree bear this description, and remain to this day a wilderness? I imagine not. The real truth is, that the provinces of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, where the late operations were carried on, are settled, and full of plantations, and at least two-thirds, and in many places five-sixth parts of it cleared of wood; and the wood consists of large trees, standing at considerable distances, free from underwood, and easily scoured with cannon. As to the "ravines," they must be in proportion to the hills which I have described. The "creeks," or rivulets, are all fordable, or may be passed by marching a few miles round; and there are no "marshes" or fenny grounds within the country. This ground, when cleared, is meadow, and of six times the value of
 upland,

upland, and therefore the first improved. These are all facts, well known to the people of that country, and which can be proved by many gentlemen now in London. How then can it be possible that this country can be, what the General has attempted to prove in the House of Commons, “ the strongest country in the world ?”

“ *I shall now proceed, says the General, with my remarks, page by page.*” As I have no particular objection to this method, I will do myself the honour of strictly attending him.

In page 3, of the Letters, I have asserted, “ That in this country we have lately seen two armies, one meditating its conquest, the other its defence. We have seen the British army penetrating into its heart, a circuit of near two hundred miles, from Long Island, by the White Plains, to Trenton, and from the Elk Ferry to Philadelphia, in defiance of the utmost efforts of an enemy perfectly acquainted with every advantageous spot of ground; and we have seen that army taking, with ease and little loss, every strong post possessed by the enemy, who have fled at its approach.”

Page 39.] “ *This description,*” says the General, “ *is introduced to prove that the country is not* VERY STRONG NOR IMPRACTICABLE; *but it only proves, that the Generals and officers, commanding the several corps, were indefatigable in their duty,*

“ and surmounted all the difficulties which they met
 “ with in those marches.”

I have never enquired, nor am I now enquiring into the conduct of the officers of the army; nor have I ever had any reason to do so. Whenever led on to action, their conduct has shewn that they were actuated by honour, and a love of their country; and I therefore acknowledge, that they were indefatigable (that is, not fatigued) in their duty, whenever called to it; because I am confident that many, if not all, would have surmounted difficulties tenfold as great as any of those to which they were led, and not think it a *fatigue*. In the whole tenor of my Letters, I have only censured the indolence and misconduct of their Leader; my censures could not, in justice, extend further.

Ibid.] “ *The Commander in Chief, however,*
 “ *will be supposed to have had some share in the*
 “ *merit of these successes.*”

He certainly had; I will not only suppose it, but frankly confess it. Whenever the General found himself either disposed, or *under a necessity* of meditating a blow against the enemy, he never failed of success. At Long Island and the White Plains, in the progress of the army to the Delaware, and at the Brandywine, he succeeded as far as he chose: had he pressed the advantages his truly judicious manœuvres gave him, he might have ended the rebellion. I have not censured
 the

the General for want of abilities ; this is a failing for which he ought not to be censured ; the blame in that case would justly fall on his employers. My strictures are confined to his non-exertion of those military abilities which were demonstrated in his manœuvres on Long Island and the Brandywine, and that undaunted courage which was so apparent in the action at Bunker's Hill.

Ibid.] “ *But it is not true that the enemy always fled at our approach, nor that we took all their strong posts with ease and little loss.*”

Here the General takes advantage of the words “ always fled,” and, to serve the purpose of contradicting me, applies them to all the conduct of the rebels in the general actions. A small share of candour, or a little attention to the paragraph he cites to make out this contradiction, would have taught him, that I did not allude to the battles of Long Island, Fort Washington, or Brandywine. I had in the same paragraph declared, “ that the British army had penetrated from Long Island, by the White Plains, to Trenton, *in defiance of the utmost efforts of the enemy,*” including the very instances he mentions ; and therefore he might have perceived, that the words “ *always fled*” could only refer to those *formidable unfortified “ posts,*” which are to be found “ *in every quarter of a mile,*” and even in “ *every one hundred yards,*” in that country, the best of all other countries “ *calcu-*
“ *lated*

“ *lated for the defensive.*” And here my expression will be found strictly true; for it is known that the rebels fled at the approach of the Royal army, at Newark, Brunswick, Princeton, twice at Trenton, near Newport in Newcastle county, and at Goshen in Pennsylvania*; at several of which places, had they been pursued by 5000 British, their army must have been utterly ruined.

Ibid.] “ *Much might be said upon the state of loyalty in America. SOME are loyal from principle, MANY from interest, MANY from resentment; and there are OTHERS who wish success to Great Britain, from a recollection of the happiness they enjoyed under her government.*”

While I express my surprize at, I cannot help thanking the General for, this candid confession respecting the loyalty of the people of America. It amounts to a full acknowledgment of all I have contended for in the Letters respecting it. The force of the facts I have alledged, has, I trust, extorted it from him—but, I apprehend, unwarily; otherwise he would not have taken up near four pages to disprove the facts adduced in support of a truth he so fully confesses. The task of reconciling this confession to his attempt, in the House of Commons, to prove that the “ Americans were almost univerversally disloyal,” I cheerfully leave to those who will undertake it.

* See the General's Letters.

I had said in the Letters, that some, who were high in office in America, in order to justify *the neglect and inhuman treatment which his Majesty's faithful subjects had received*, and to throw a veil over that misconduct which had wasted, unnecessarily, many millions for the nation, sacrificed its true interest, and lost its honour, were the inventors of the report of the universal disloyalty of the Americans. To this the General answers,

Page 39.] “ *I am at a loss to know what species of neglect and inhumanity is here meant ; I am contented that strictures should be made upon my professional conduct, but I feel myself hurt as a man when I am accused of inhumanity.*”

Ever pleased to do the General justice, I will relieve his feelings as a man ; and I wish I could also relieve those which he must experience as an officer. There is nothing in my Letters which charges him with doing *personally* a single act of inhumanity. My strictures were confined to his “ professional conduct ;” and the subsequent part of my Letters explains what I mean by the inhuman treatment which his Majesty's faithful subjects had received ; and, as he has misunderstood me, I will again explain it. The inhuman treatment alluded to, was the indiscriminate plunder suffered to be committed, by the soldiery under his command, on Staten Island, Long Island, the White Plains, and in the province of New Jersey, where friend and foe, loyalist and rebel, met with

the same fate ; a series of continued plunder, which was a disgrace to an army pretending to discipline, and which, while it tended to relax the discipline of the troops, could not fail to create the greatest aversion, even in the breast of loyalty itself, to a service which, under the fair pretence of giving them protection, robbed them, in many instances, of even the necessaries of life.

In vain, I imagine, will the General plead, before the candour and humanity of the public, his orders and proclamations forbidding plunder. Laws, without execution, are but a dead letter ; and his orders and proclamations, so often repeated, without punishing the atrocious offenders, were considered as blank paper ; and the plundering continued as much after as before they were issued, until he passed into Pennsylvania, where, having made an example or two of the delinquents, the plunder in a great measure ceased. Had this mischief been nipped in the bud by a few examples, which might have been easily done in an army so perfectly submissive to discipline in every other respect as the British was, the relaxation in discipline which lost Trenton, the impressions made on the minds of the Loyalists, to the prejudice of the King's service, and the disgrace that was brought on the honour, justice, and humanity of Britain, could not have taken place.

To vindicate himself against this visionary charge of personal inhumanity, he tells us, page 40, of

his great humanity and benevolence to the people of Boston, and that “ *it is upon record (Proclamation 28th October, 1775), that their services were* “ *courted, by recommending a defensive association;* “ *and that arms were offered to all who would declare* “ *themselves willing to contribute their assistance in* “ *the preservation of good order and government* “ *within the town of Boston.*”

What his behaviour was to the people of Boston, they can best inform the public; the task I have assumed, is, only to enquire into his conduct in the Middle Colonies. Why, then, not tell us of his wise and prudent conduct there? Was it because he is conscious that it was not so wise and prudent in the Middle Colonies as at Boston? If this sense of the matter did not prevail with him, it was impolitic to mention this proclamation; because it only informs us, that he knew what ought to be done, and did it not. To draw assistance to the British force, wherever he operated, was most certainly his duty. If the Loyalists in Boston were to be trusted, when associated, with arms, men of the same principles were to be equally trusted in the provinces of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, where they were more numerous. Why then was there not a like proclamation issued in any of these provinces? Had this been done, the salutary effects are obvious, from an indubitable fact. Since his resignation, upwards of 5000 Loyalists are embodied in

arms for the defence of New York. Had this been done, it would have enabled Sir H. Clinton to have led, instead of between two and three, at least 8000 men, in a diversion in favour of the Northern army, and saved it; for Sir Henry did not leave more regulars, than the number of Loyalists, thus embodied, for the defence of New York, when he passed up the North river, and found himself too weak to proceed. Had this been done, he might, if he did not choose to support the Northern army, have taken at least 5000 men more with him to Pennsylvania; a number equal to Washington's whole force, the greater part of the time the two armies were in that province.

And had the like proclamation been issued in New Jersey, when the General was at Trenton, and had driven Washington's enfeebled army, of 3000 men, and all the officers of the rebel State, out of the province; and when the General himself incautiously confesses, "that his successes had
 "intimidated the leaders of the rebellion, and
 "nearly induced a general submission*," all those men in New Jersey, who were loyal "from principle, from interest, from resentment, and from
 "a recollection of the happiness they enjoyed
 "under the British government," would have associated in arms, and formed a solid barrier of

* Narrative, p. 40.

defence against every attempt of the rebels, except that of Washington's army.

And had the General issued the like proclamation, when in Philadelphia, he would have obtained a militia of 3500 men. Had he invited the people in the peninsula between the Delaware and Chesapeak, to associate, and assist him in arms; and had he, as he was requested, landed a few men to support them, and to furnish them with arms and ammunition; the 2000 Loyalists, who had associated, in less than three days, in three of the thirteen counties only, would have been immediately in arms on the part of Great-Britain; and no man, who is acquainted with the general loyalty of the people of that country, can doubt, but that their numbers would have increased, in a month, to 6000, if not 8000 men. Nothing could have been wanting to have carried this measure into complete effect, and to have reduced this peninsula to the peace of the Crown, but a small post at Wilmington, to cover that country; because, while that post remained, Washington could not, with any degree of prudence, trust his army, or any part of it, in that peninsula. This would have been a snare into which the British General ought to have led him, and out of which he could not have extricated himself: he would in that case have been between the associated Loyalists and the post at Wilmington, where the British army might have been transported by water in one, or have
marched

marched by land in two days, from Philadelphia. All these truths must, upon a slight view of the chart of that country, strike the military eye with instantaneous conviction; and yet that invitation and encouragement which he boasts of having published at Boston, was in this country shamefully neglected.

The General acknowledges, that he found in Philadelphia 4482 * male inhabitants capable of bearing arms. Of this number there were not fifty who had taken any part against the British government; the rest, being about one eleventh part of the inhabitants, had fled; less than 1000 were Quakers: so that, had the General pursued the same wise measure in Philadelphia which he did at Boston, and which General Knyphausen afterwards pursued at New York; had he suffered the people to have chosen their own officers, and embodied themselves for the defence of the city; a militia of 3500 men, besides the numerous refugees who attended him, would have formed an armed force, which, with a few vessels of war, and 1000 regular troops, would have been a sufficient defence for that city against any force of the enemy, except Washington's army. This would have enabled him to have marched out with his whole force against Washington, while he remained from December to the middle

* Narrative, p. 54.

of June with his reduced, sickly, and half-starved army at the Valley Forge, where that army might have been attacked in their weak intrenchments, or surrounded and besieged, and reduced by famine in one week at farthest, and an end have been put to the rebellion *.

Page 41 is employed in entertaining the reader with the profuse liberality of the General towards Mr. Galloway, and with some oblique general charges, striking at his popularity and integrity.

What either that Gentleman's popularity or integrity has to do with Sir William Howe's military conduct, the reader will be puzzled to discern. I shall not therefore, in *this Reply*, undertake a vindication of Mr. Galloway's personal character. But, at the same time, I cannot help observing, that general charges against either a public or private character are little better than assassinations in the dark, against which the most perfect innocence has no chance of guarding itself. The charges against the General in my Letters are so particular, specific, and defined, that he might, if he could, vindicate himself against them. But his honour, it seems, has not led him to deal thus honourably by Mr. Galloway.

In order to prove that many of the Pennsylvanians were attached to the British government,

* See a Letter from a Committee to the President of Congress, in the Appendix.

I have asserted, that during our possession of Philadelphia, the people of the country, at the risque of their lives, had supplied the British army, navy, and inhabitants, amounting to not less than 50,000 persons, with all kinds of provisions, while they refused these supplies to the rebel General. These facts Sir William Howe does not venture to deny. I thought, and still think, they fully support the matter I wished to prove. In so great a contest, in the event of which the feelings, the interest, and happiness of mankind were so deeply involved, and their passions so violently engaged, neutrality of sentiment or attachment is unprecedented—is impossible. Men's opinions and wishes will become fixed in favour of one side or the other; and I concluded, how reasonably the Reader will determine, that those men who voluntarily supplied Washington's army against their Sovereign, were *rebels*; and that those who, every mile they passed, risked their lives, and yet at that risque supplied the King's troops with provisions, from five to an hundred miles distance, were friends and faithful subjects. But it seems the General is of a different opinion.—Hear his arguments.

Page 42.] “ *That the people of the country*
 “ *brought in fresh provisions to us, and refused such*
 “ *supplies, as much as they DARED, to the rebel*
 “ *General, is certain. But I do not admit, that*
 “ *this conduct proceeded from the motives ascribed*
 “ *by*

“ *by the Author. The people of the country had no
 “ opinion of the value of Congress money. They
 “ knew they should receive mostly hard money in
 “ payment ; and they had an opportunity of carrying
 “ back with them a variety of necessary articles.—
 “ These, I apprehend, were the real motives of all
 “ that kind of assistance which we procured from the
 “ country people.”*

What a horrid idea of human nature must the General have entertained when he drew these conclusions! Would not a little charity have convinced him, that men who were loyal “ from principle—
 “ from resentment,—from a recollection of former happiness,” and whose actions strictly corresponded, were actuated by motives more honourable and more virtuous, than that of acquiring a little hard money and a few necessaries? Can it be possible that he could believe, that the honour of “ principle,” the powerful impulses of just resentment for injuries sustained, and a lively sense of former “ happiness,” of which they had been wantonly deprived, were all effaced by such paltry and transitory considerations? Did he pass this severe, this cruel judgment on the faithful subjects of his Sovereign, and the tried friends of his country, by his own feelings—the test of his own actions? Were the Loyalists, whom the General, after all the assistance they had given to him, has thus ungratefully traduced, to retaliate, with how much more reason might they

say, That he had sacrificed his military fame, his duty to his Sovereign and his fellow-subjects, and the interest and safety of his country, to the dirty purposes of a faction, whose whole conduct is founded on private interest and ambition!

Page 43.] “ *The Author says, they did this AT THE RISQUE OF THEIR LIVES. There was in fact THAT APPEARANCE; but I always SUSPECTED that General Washington, through policy, connived at this kind of commerce.*”

The argument here rests upon the feeble support of the General's “suspicion,” while he acknowledges that “appearance” was against that suspicion. If appearance was against it, upon what was his suspicion founded? It could not be upon facts; for in that case his opinion could not rest in suspicion. In truth, the facts were all against it: For what could induce Washington to keep different posts surrounding the British lines, and constant patrols, frequently coming within sight of them, but to prevent a supply of provisions? These patrols put to death, without hesitation, several persons, for no other offence than that of supplying the British troops. Some were tried by a court-martial, and received two hundred lashes; and others were branded by a hot iron in the hand, with G H, and sent into the British lines, as a mark of contempt of the British General. And yet all this is not sufficient to remove his “suspicions” of the disloyalty of these faithful

faithful people, nor to induce him to believe that his enemy, who was besieging him, intended to deprive him of the means of subsisting his troops.

Ibid.] “ *The General is at a loss to understand what I mean by many thousands of Loyalists concealing themselves in distant provinces, and taking refuge among the savages, to avoid entering into the war.*”

I did not mean, as he suspects, “ the insurgents of Carolina;” and if I had, I should have thought that a General who had commanded his Majesty’s army, might have found a word more descriptive of a number of Loyalists who had taken up arms under the authority of his Majesty’s Governor, to support his government, than the word *insurgent*. However, the men alluded to were those who, when draughted from the militia of the rebel States, rather than serve in their army, fled the provinces from whence they were draughted, into others where they were not known. Many took refuge among the Indians, and have since joined Colonel Butler and Captain Brant, and are now serving against the rebels. This was a common practice; and it was partly owing to this practice that Washington’s continental army has been so small ever since their defeat on Long Island, as not to amount, at any one time, to more than 10,000 men.

To my assertion, " That many thousands came
" over to the British troops for protection," the
General answers,

Ibid.] " *I aver, that at no time did men in
" numbers come over to the British troops.*"

Here he does not venture to deny the fact al-
leged, yet he manifestly intends to mislead the
reader. And to do this, he is obliged to add the
words, " at no time," and " in numbers." Thus
he artfully attempts to avoid a fact which cannot
be denied. I did not assert, that thousands came
over " at one time," or " in numbers." The
General suffered Washington to superintend his
lines at New York with so much circumspection,
as not to suffer the Loyalists to come in in num-
bers; and when he went to Pennsylvania, the
people were ordered, by his declaration, to " re-
" main peaceably at their usual places of abode."

But had the fact been denied, it could be sup-
ported by the number of refugees, persecuted on
account of their loyalty, who came from time to
time into Philadelphia and New York, many of
whom are at this time embodied in corps in
his Majesty's service. And it appears from the
testimony of Lord Cornwallis (p. 68.), that, while
the British army was at Trenton and Bordentown,
" three or four hundred of the inhabitants"
came in *every day for ten days* (that is, while the
troops staid there), and received certificates for
their

their protection; and he might have said with truth, that before the taking of Trenton, not less than seven thousand had, in the space of three weeks only, received those certificates. But these certificates were of little use to the unhappy people;—all who were in or near the British lines were plundered, and the faith of the General, pledged to the people by his proclamation, was shamefully violated.

Upon my assertion, That “the foot and cavalry sent over to America, amounted to 52,815; and of that number 40,874 were under the command of Sir William Howe,” the General observes,

Page 45.] “*The Author would here impress the Reader with an opinion, that, AT THE TIME OF MY ARRIVAL AT STATEN ISLAND, my army amounted to 48,874, and the rebel army to 18,000, militia included.*”

The conclusion here drawn from my words, I may venture to assert, never was made by any candid and sensible reader. The words are indefinite as to the time or times when the troops were sent, and convey nothing more, than that all the troops sent over amounted to 52,815, of which troops General Howe had 40,874 under his command. But what could he do? He could not deny the fact; and it was too important an evidence of his indolence and misconduct to be passed over in silence; and therefore he resolves

to torture my general expressions to a particular meaning, in order to divert the reader from reflecting on the superiority of his force to that of the rebels. Indeed, I have often occasion to admire the like skill and ingenuity in the course of his observations: for where he cannot safely attack in front, he seldom fails to make use of stratagem to get round his opponent. What pity it is! What millions would have been saved to the nation, what heavy disasters to his country would he have prevented, had he discovered equal skill, or the like stratagem, in surrounding and attacking his inferior and undisciplined enemy in America!

The art here made use of will appear yet more barefaced, when the reader is reminded, that in the Appendix to my Letters, I state his numbers in August 1776, when he was at Staten Island, at not more than 24,000 men. But he contends, that I have exaggerated his numbers; for that when he landed from Staten Island on Long Island, he had only “20,121 *rank and file*, of which 1677 “were sick.” To diminish his real force, he here gives us only the rank and file, omitting the numerous officers, from himself down to a drummer, which generally amount, in every corps, to near one sixth part of the whole. I am not a military man; my design was to lay before my country his real force, that they might form a just judgment of his conduct. I have not therefore wrote in a military dialect; and if I had, few of my
 readers

readers would have understood me; and could I believe that I had misrepresented his real force in any one instance, through the want of that knowledge, it would give me pain. But this I have not done. His own returns laid before the House of Commons, in the last year, will prove, that he had at Staten Island 24,464 effectives, rank and file, and fit for duty; and, in the whole, 26,980, officers not included, who, when added, will amount to 31,625.

Ibid.] He finds much fault with my estimate of his real numbers; and adds, “*If I were to follow the Author’s mode of computation, when he states the number of men under my command, I should say, and from better authority, that General Washington had under his command in May 1776, in the several provinces, an army of 80,000 men;*” and he refers to a return of the rebel strength in May 1776, printed at New York.

The General does not lay any stress on this sham return. He knew its fallacy: It was a return of men raised, and intended to be raised, and which were never raised, calculated to give him a formidable idea of the rebel force; and being ridiculous in itself, it is produced to render my estimate of his own force ridiculous and false. But to expose his evasion of what he does not venture to deny, I will give the reader his real numbers from his own returns. The first column shall contain the total effectives rank and file; the second,

second, the total army, officers included; the third, that of the American army; that every unprejudiced and impartial reader may compare the British force with that of the rebels. For, after all our inquiries into the minute transactions of any military command, the first question of a man of sense will be, What was the respective force and discipline of the two contending armies?

	Total Effectives, Rank and File.	Total Army, Officers included.	Total Rebel Force.
1776.			
Aug. 9.	24,247	29,308	18,000 *
Nov. 22.	26,980	31,755	4,000
Dec.	—	—	3,300 †
1777.			
July 17.	30,049	35,047	8,000

Such was the state of the force under Sir William Howe's immediate command, exclusive of the garrison at Rhode Island, which added, amounts, in the whole, to 40,874; and such the numbers

* General Robertson says, in his Examination, the rebel force was only 16,000.

† See the General's Narrative, p. 8. Washington attacked Colonel Rhall with his whole force, except Cadwallader's brigade, which did not consist of 500 men; and those were prevented, by the ice, from crossing the Delaware, and attacking Bordentown, at which place Colonel Donop had left only 80 grenadiers. At this time the remains of Lee's corps had joined Washington, who before had not 2800 men.

of his inferior, and truly contemptible, enemy, notwithstanding, as the General confesses, “every compulsory means *” was made use of to increase them; and yet he suffered that enemy, lying in an unfortified post, within twenty miles of his quarters, to harass and distress his troops from January to July, without taking a single step to dislodge them.

The same unjustifiable indolence and misconduct attended his proceedings while in Philadelphia. Here the General lay in his quarters all the winter and spring, until the month of June; contenting himself with sending out occasional parties to cover the loyalists, who were continually feeding the officers of his army with all the delicacies and luxuries which the country afforded. To support this charge, nothing more will be necessary, than to lay before the public a few facts notorious in America, and to many gentlemen now in England.

Although the General, in page 60, asserts, that his whole force at Philadelphia was no more than 13,799, rank and file, it does appear, by his own returns, that he had, on the 3d of October, after the battle of Brandywine, 15,898 effectives, rank and file; total, rank and file, 17,752; and, when the officers are added, 20,680. With this force,

* See his Letter to Lord George Germain, February 12, 1777. See also his Letter, March 5, 1778.

a few men lost in the battle of Germantown excepted, he went into winter-quarters in Philadelphia, where he says it was "well accommodated."

Washington, with about 9000 men, took up his quarters at the Valley Forge, within twenty miles of Philadelphia. Having no houses for his troops, he was obliged to build uncomfortable huts with round logs, filled in with clay, and covered with loose straw and dirt, in such a manner as not to secure them from the weather. This situation the General, in his letter of the 5th of March, describes in these words: "The rebel army continues in the same situation as when I had last the honour of writing to your Lordship, butted at Valley Forge, where their men suffer exceedingly from the very inclement weather, which has induced numbers to desert." The camp-dissorder raged among his men, which obliged him to establish no less than eleven hospitals; and many died, many deserted to their several provinces, and near 3000 of them came over to the British army. From these circumstances, his army was reduced, before the month of March, to less than 4000 men; and by far the greater part of these were in a manner naked; many without shoes or stockings, and but few, except the Virginians, with the necessary clothing*.

* Mr. Galloway's Examination, p. 27, 28, 29, 30.

His horses were in a condition yet worse; they were constantly exposed to showers of rain, and falls of snow, both day and night; many of them died; the rest were so emaciated as to be unfit for labour; and, in addition to this distressful situation, Washington had not in his camp, at any one time, one week's provisions either for man or horse, and sometimes his men were totally destitute*.

Washington's camp was by no means difficult of access; far less so than the posts occupied by him at the Brandywine; and in one part of the front the ascent was scarcely perceptible, and his rear was commanded by higher ground. His ditches were not three feet in depth; nor was there a drummer in the British army, who could not, with the utmost ease, leap over them; and his defences might have been battered down with six-pounders.

This is not an exaggerated picture of the rebel army, nor of the weakness of its situation. A brief account of it I have given in my Letters, page 87, which the General, in his Defence, has not denied; indeed, he has thought it prudent to take no notice of it, any more than of many of the most important charges contained in those Letters. Upon these facts I leave the candour of the public to find, if it can be found, a reason why the General did not attack, or surround, and

* See a Letter, in the Appendix, from a Committee of Congress appointed to enquire into the State of Washington's army.

take by siege, Washington's whole army. His numbers were greater than those of the rebels, who surrounded and took a British army, under General Burgoyne, of 4000 veteran troops, in a situation not so distressful as that of Washington.

Numerous are the instances in which the General has perverted my meaning to his own purposes. I have charged him with "declining to trust the faithful and loyal subjects with arms, or to make use of the *well-affected force in the Colonies, to assist him in reducing, or in defending after reduced, either cities or provinces.*" In this charge I alluded to his declining to embody the Loyalists, as a militia, in New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia. In New York, the militia, which he declined to embody, amounts to 5000 men. In New Jersey, upwards of fifty of the first men in the county of Monmouth, &c. came in to offer their service in disarming the disaffected, and to restore the province to the peace of the Crown; but they could not procure access to the General, although their wishes were communicated to his Aid de Camp. They returned to their respective families, chagrined and disgusted at the *hauteur* of the General; some of them, notwithstanding, are now at New York, under the protection of the British army, having abandoned their property, hazarded their lives, and sacrificed the happiness of their families. At Philadelphia, at least 3,500
faithful

faithful militia might have been embodied in arms for the defence of that city, while the army operated against Washington; and had the General at the same time cordially invited the Loyalists to take up arms, as a militia, in their several counties, under gentlemen in whom they had a confidence, for the particular purposes of seizing on and disarming the disaffected to Government, and defending their several districts, the whole province of Pennsylvania, and the extensive peninsula below, would have been restored to the peace of the Crown before the end of the campaign.

To parry this charge, the General asserts, page 56, "*Many of my proclamations contained invitations to arms, and promises of large encouragement.*" Where these proclamations are to be found, he has not told us; they never were published in Pennsylvania, New York, or New Jersey; and I verily believe they never were written. The proclamation issued in 1776, in New Jersey, contained nothing more than a promise of pardon and protection to those who should come in and take the oaths of allegiance; that at the head of Elk rested only in promising the people protection from the "depredations of his army," and calling on the disaffected "to remain peaceably at their usual places of abode." The General surely cannot here mean the "many proclamations" issued within his lines, inviting the people to enlist in the regular Provincial service? This cannot be; be-

cause, to use his own words, it would be “ a quibble which would never have entered into the head of an English” nor of an American “ lawyer.”

Before I leave the last-mentioned proclamation, I cannot, in justice to the character of Mr. Galloway, avoid taking some notice of a paragraph in *Page 56.*] “ As this declaration was calculated for the meridian of Pennsylvania, of the people of which province Mr. Galloway professed an intimate knowledge, *I consulted him previously upon it; I framed it agreeably to his ideas; when written, it had his full approbation.*”

Here, I hope, the General’s memory has totally failed him. The facts relating to this transaction are truly these. While the fleet lay at the Hook, on its way to the Chesapeak, and not before, Captain Montresor brought this declaration, *in manuscript*, from the General, to Mr. Galloway, with a request that he would consider it. Upon the first view, a number of objections arose; he immediately committed them to paper, supported with his reasons. These he returned, with the declaration, to Captain Montresor, to be carried back to the General. Upon Captain Montresor’s return, Mr. Galloway asked, what the General said to his objections. The answer was, that they were not admitted; *for the declarations had been already printed off at New York.*

This

This is the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Captain Montrefor, and two other gentlemen, were privy to this transaction, whose honour, I have no doubt, will lead them to confirm it. On this paragraph I shall leave the reader to make his own comment, with only observing, that the General, in every instance where he has taken occasion to mention Mr. Galloway's conduct and opinions; has been guilty of what charity would lead me to hope are only failures of memory.

The General labours hard, in his Narrative, to vindicate his conduct in not supporting the Northern army. Nor ought we to be surpris'd at it, as it was a neglect which strikes the mind on the first reflection; a blunder to which we owe all our present misfortunes. His arguments may be compris'd under three heads. 1st, That he had no express orders to support it; 2d, That he had not force sufficient; and, 3d, That his *Southern expedition* was approved of by the Secretary of State.

In reply to the first argument, should we agree to what he asserts, that the express orders to support the Northern army were never received, yet we know that a letter from Lord George Germain, of the 3d of March, 1777, came to his hands on the 8th of May*. That in this letter he is informed, it was his Majesty's opinion, that "a warm

* See Letter of this date in the Parliamentary Register, 17-9.

“ diversion

“ diversion should be made on the coasts of the “ Massachusetts ;” and that the “ benefits” which “ must inevitably result” from it, are pointed out, viz. “ That it will not only tend much to “ impede the levies” for the Continental army, but to the security of our trade, and would “ keep “ the rebels at home,” for the internal defence of their own respective districts. A more wise, or a more necessary diversion, to save the Northern army, could not have been devised ; and had it been performed at the time General Burgoyne passed from Ticonderoga towards Albany, it must have produced the effects his Majesty wisely predicted. Levies never were, nor can be made, in the scene and bustle of war ; and men will not leave the defence of their fire-sides, their principal sea-ports, and most valuable cities, to fight in a different province, and in distant woods, where there is nothing to defend.

This diversion, therefore, had it been made, must either have drawn General Gates, with his whole army, to the defence of the capital cities on the sea coast, or at least have detained at home more than one half of those men, which, by this neglect, were enabled to join his army ; and in that case the Northern army could not have failed of overcoming, with ease, every possible difficulty.

But I will suppose that no such diversion had been directed. The General could not but know, that the object of the two armies was the same,
and

and that it was the immediate business of both to form a junction. Was it not then his duty to see so large and important a reinforcement in a state of safety, at least, before he carried his army to a place which deprived him of the power to support it? However, it seems, notwithstanding his Majesty's directions, and the weighty importance of the measure, that the General and his Noble Brother "consulted upon the expediency of "the diversion*," yet neither made it, nor took any measures to support the Northern expedition; in consequence of which, a British army passed under the yoke of rebellion.

I have hitherto reasoned upon a supposition, that the General had no express orders to co-operate with, and join the Northern army; and I trust, the arguments I have advanced are sufficient to prove, that, in not doing it, he acted contrary to his manifest duty. But, to strip him even of the shadow of an excuse, I will prove that he had those orders, or what fully amounted to them.

On the 25th of September, 1775, he received his commission of Commander in Chief †. On the 9th of October he undertakes to propose the plan of his future operations; recommends the evacuation of Boston, and that a body of 12,000 men be

* Narrative, p. 12.

† See his Letters to the Earl of Dartmouth, dated the 5th of November, and 9th of October, 1775.

employed “ from New York, *to open the communication with Canada in the first instance,*” and that an army of Canadians and Indians from Canada should meet him; and, that “ the accomplishment of the primary object for opening the communication, being obtained by the *two armies*, these corps might take separate routes into the province of Massachusetts Bay.” And in his letter of the 2d of April, 1777, he points out “ the advantages that might arise by securing *Albany and the adjacent country.*”

Strictly conformable to these ideas of the General, Government proceeded. His own army was reinforced with numbers so great, that it struck him with utter amazement. Another army was formed, and ordered to proceed from Canada to join his troops at Albany. On the 25th of March, the Secretary of State transmitted to Sir Guy Carleton, at Quebec, the plan of operations for both armies; in which he is ordered “ to detach General Burgoyne,” and to direct him, “ so detached, to proceed with all possible expedition *to Albany, and put himself under the command of Sir William Howe;*” and further adds, “ with a view of quelling the rebellion as soon as possible, it is become necessary that the most *speedy junction of the two armies should be effected.*” An official copy of this letter was transmitted to Sir William Howe for his information and direction,
and

and was received by him on the 5th of June, six weeks before he failed on his wild and unfortunate expedition to the Chesapeake. By these letters, the following truths are in full evidence: That the plan of the *Northern operations was the General's own*, and not the plan of Administration: That he received *written orders* to "effect a speedy junction" of the two armies, and that that junction was to be made *at Albany*. This is so plain, that it would be an affront to the reader's understanding to say more on the subject. In vain will the General plead, that he never received his orders. For what end was the official copy of the plan of operations sent to him? Was it to answer no purpose? Or was it to signify his Majesty's pleasure and orders respecting those operations? How idle! how truly trifling, then, must this part of his Defence appear, when the *junction of the two armies* was not only conformable to his own plan, but clearly pointed out by reason, military duty, and by his Majesty's orders!

As to his second objection, that he had not force sufficient, I need only remind my reader, that the General had under his command, on the 17th of July 1777, as appears by his own returns, 40,874 men, officers included. His Southern army consisted of 20,680; the garrison of Rhode Island required only 2400, as he confesses in his secret letter of the 2d April, 1777; his remaining force

was 17,794. In the same letter, he states as sufficient for the defence of New York and New York Island 3200, of Paulus Hook 300, of Staten Island 1200; in the whole 4700. This number, deducted out of 17,794, will leave 13,094, besides 3000 effectives, of the provincial corps under General Tryon. This will make the force under his command, exclusive of his Southern army, and his necessary garrisons, 16,094. I will also suppose, which is a very extravagant supposition, that every sixth man was an invalid, and it will leave 13,412 effectives, whom he might have applied to the support of the Northern army; but, not inclined to support that army, he left useless thousands in the garrison of Rhode Island, and carried with him, in his wild circuitous voyage to the Chesapeake, as many thousands, equally unnecessary; for there was not the most distant prospect that the enemy could ever raise an army, equal, in effective force, to 10,000 veteran troops.

But further. He acknowledges, page 61, that he "left at New York about 8500 rank and file, fit for duty." I have shewn, that he thought 4700 were competent to the defence of all his garrisons; why then did he not order the remaining 3800 to make the diversion on the coasts of New England, as had been directed by his Majesty? a force abundantly more than sufficient, if properly conducted, to have detained the whole militia of that country in the defence of their capital towns

and valuable sea-ports, which must have enabled General Burgoyne to pass without difficulty to New York.

The third argument remains to be examined. The General, in his Narrative, as well as in his Observations, repeatedly declares that the Secretary of State approved of his "expedition to Pennsylvania." This assertion is of the same complexion with that of Mr. Galloway's approving of a proclamation, at a time he had never heard of it. The facts are: In his letter on the 20th of January, 1777, he proposes "to detach a *corps only* to "enter the Delaware *by sea*, and the *main body* of "the army to penetrate into Pennsylvania *by way* "of *Jersey*." This measure was founded in the soundest policy, and justified by common sense; because, had it been pursued, Washington, having at that time only 8000 men, must have fought, or fled before him out of New Jersey, over the Delaware. Washington's safety depended on his taking this route; his military stores and provisions were all on the other side of the Delaware: cut off from these essentials of war, he must have given up the contest. Washington once defeated, or driven over the Delaware, the province of New Jersey might have been immediately restored to the peace of the Crown. Philadelphia, altogether without defence by land, and very little better by water, must have immediately fallen. A garrison, more numerous than Washington's whole
army,

army, might have been left for its defence, and 10,000 men, at least, spared to operate up the North River, or on the New England coasts, in favour of the Northern army. All this might have been accomplished with ease by the latter end of August, although the campaign was not opened until the 12th of June; but had the General commenced the operations on the 12th of May, the most proper month in the whole year for military operations in that part of America, it might have been completed by the latter end of July. This appearing evidently to be practicable, with the force under the General's command, every candid and sensible man must applaud the council which induced his Majesty to approve of the plan for invading Pennsylvania, "by the way of Jersey."

This approbation was communicated by Lord George Germain, in his letter of the 3d of March; but before it could reach* the General, he had altered this judicious plan for one truly ridiculous, and ruinous not only to the Northern army, but his own operations; a plan which must necessarily have been attended with a great waste of time, immense expence, unnecessary risque, and innumerable difficulties. In his letter of the 2d of April, he informs the Secretary of State, that, "from the *difficulties* and *delay* that would attend the passing the river

* He did not receive it till the 8th of May.

" Delaware,

“ Delaware, by a march through Jerſey, I propoſe
 “ to invade Pennſylvania *by ſea*; and from this
 “ arrangement we muſt *probably* abandon the Jer-
 “ ſeys, which, by *the former plan*, would not have
 “ been the caſe.”

Will the General aſſert, that the Miniſter of the American department ever approved of this material, this miſchievous change, in his plan? Did he ever approve of his abandoning New Jerſey, his embarking on ſhip-board his whole army, and ſubjecting them to all the riſques and dangers of the ſea, without the leaſt neceſſity or reaſon? The American Miniſter is too wiſe, and too well verſed in military ſcience, to have approved of a plan pregnant with ſuch folly and infatuation; if he did, the General is called on to produce ſome proofs of that approbation.

This being the truth, the General will labour in vain to throw the blame of his own military abſurdities upon the ſhoulders of others. The plan was truly *his own*; and it bears ſo *ſtrong* a reſemblance of his other military operations, that no one acquainted with them can poſſibly doubt it. For by this wretched project the three ſtrong poſts of Brunſwick, Bonumtown, and Amboy, which had been fortified at an immense national expence, were to be *given up*; the province of New Jerſey, which had been ſo lately reduced, was to be *abandoned* to an enemy conſiſting of leſs than one third of his own numbers; and a
 Britiſh

British army, both cavalry and foot, was to be *embarked* in the hot holds of ships, in the hottest months of the year, to pass into a yet more southern and sickly climate, and that too at a season when contrary winds never yet failed to prevail. All these difficulties, together with the dangers and risques of the ocean, were to be encountered in preference to a march of *fifty-eight miles* through a fine open country, intersected by a variety of roads, and stored with every necessary for the accommodation of an army.

But it seems, “ the difficulties and delays that
 “ would attend the passage of the Delaware, and
 “ the want of sufficient means to pass so *large* a
 “ river *,” were the obstructions to his first plan. What will the reader say, when he is informed, that this *so large*, and *so much dreaded*, river is ever, in the months of June, July, and August, fordable in a variety of places, between Trenton and Coryel’s Ferry, on the different roads to Philadelphia? and yet, if it was not so, that it is not, in many places, 300 yards wide; that the ground on the Jersey side commands, in many parts, that on the Pennsylvania side, so that our army might have been perfectly covered by cannon in its passage; and that the General had prepared more boats and pontoons, which he carried with him to Brunswick, than were necessary for that pur-

* Narrative, p. 16.

pose. Thus circumstanced, and thus prepared, what would an Amherst, a Wolfe, or a Bouquet, have thought of difficulties so truly insignificant!

As I have now before me Sir William Howe's general plans of operation, I cannot avoid taking notice of his change of opinion. As soon as he was appointed, his plan "was to open a communication with Canada, in the first instance*." Soon after, with much good sense, he resolves to prosecute the advantages he had gained in New Jersey, and to go to Philadelphia *by land* †. This resolution suddenly changes for a worse, to go *by sea* ‡. We next see him alter this resolution for one infinitely worse still, and to be equalled by none, save that of going to Philadelphia by way of the West Indies; for he resolves to go to Philadelphia, by "taking the course of the Chesapeak." And even in this fourth resolution he does not continue long, but changes it for his third, and again determines to go up "the Delaware;" and that for a very good reason, "in order to be nearer New York ||." And yet, after all this confusion in opinion, we have seen his most judicious plan, approved of

* See his Letter of the 9th of October, 1775.

† See his Letter of the 20th of January, 1777.

‡ See his Letter of the 2d of April, 1777.

|| In the last paragraph of his Letter, of 16th July, 1777, he says, "I propose going up the Delaware, *in order to be nearer this place* (New York) than I should be by taking the course of Chesapeak Bay, *which I once intended, and preferred to that of the Delaware.*"

by his Majesty, set aside; and another, founded solely on his own wild ideas, unapproved of by, and uncommunicated and unknown to, any but his Noble Brother and himself, and which involved the operations of the campaign in confusion and ruin, ultimately prosecuted. He led his army, contrary to his own declared opinion, that he ought to be "near New York," round Cape Charles, and wasted the best season for military operations, from June to September, encountering difficulties and dangers, which the plan approved of by his Majesty must infallibly have avoided. Such was the strange and fatal versatility of the General's councils and conduct!

It would be endless to take notice of all the misstated and mistaken facts, and the many disingenuous arguments, adduced by the General in his Vindication. I shall, therefore, in future, content myself with giving brief answers to many of them, dwelling only on the grosser blunders in his conduct.

He takes much pains to vindicate himself against the charge of not opening the campaign before the month of June. He begins with contradicting my assertion, in the Letters, that the rebel levies never could join the army before that month; and avers, that their levies "joined early "in the spring." Now this was not the fact; and it will be easy to convince the reader of its impossibility. The rebel army consisted of more than three-fourths Irish and Scotch, and less than
one-

one-fourth native Americans*. The first generally came from the back parts of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina; the second, principally from the disaffected New England colonies; so that at least three-fourths of the new levies had from two, to five and seven hundred miles to march. The inclemency of the season prevented them from setting out from the southward until the beginning of April, and later from the northward; and therefore they could not join the army "early in the spring †." The time of their junction, a small part from the Middle Colonies excepted, was about the beginning of June; before which time, however reduced the number of the enemy might be, the General would never begin his principal operations.

But he says, "*We had not forage in quarters; nor could we have carried any quantities for essential service.*"

If he had not forage in quarters, on what did his horses subsist? they were always in high order. In his campaign of 1777, he might have commanded all that Long Island, Rhode Island, and

* Mr. Galloway's Examination. p. 22.

† In his Letter of the 19th of April, he says, "Their force has been diminished, during the course of the winter, by desertion, and by detachments to the back settlements;" but he does not say a word of their receiving reinforcements, which a General, so expert in apologies for his indolence, we may presume, would have done, had any joined the rebel army at that time.

Staten Island produced ; and in that of 1778, had he chose to open it before he resigned his command, all that the environs of Philadelphia afforded, which was immense. And could he not have carried a fortnight or three weeks forage, or sufficient to enable him to have attacked his enemy, lying not more than a day's march from his quarters ? He had horses and carriages sufficient, and might have had more. Sir Jeffery Amherst carried the provisions for his army from Lancaster to Montreal ; General Forbes, from Lancaster to Fort Pitt ; and Colonel Bouquet, from Lancaster, upwards of three hundred miles, to Muskingum. But the true answer to all these weak apologies for his indolence, is, that the country was, at all seasons of the year, plentifully stored with dry forage ; and that a superior army may procure it, if the Commander of it chooses, from the same parts and places where it is daily obtained by the inferior ; and more especially where the country is generally disaffected to that inferior army : besides, it is well known to the people of that country, that the green forage, with which it abounds, is sufficiently grown to support cavalry, by the latter end of April. In a country thus possessed of dry and green forage, the General's horses could have run no risque. But there was a magnanimity which discovered itself in all his conduct, and which, if the real lovers of their country will not commend, his friends, in the opposition to Government, will support and applaud ! He scorned
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to imitate the *rash impetuosity of men*, who, too deeply impressed with the principles of honour, and desire of fame, regard no difficulties; he therefore would never pursue the enemy whom he had defeated, nor attack him when unprepared; nor would he open the campaign until the levies of his enemy were joined.

So much for the campaign in 1777. He next attempts to justify his indolence in 1778. Here he apprehends that “ he need not say much in his vindication, because, *VERY early in April*, he received his *orders to return home.*”

The terms “ *very early*” in April, are founded in mistake. He did not receive a permission from his Majesty to return, until the 14th of that month *; nor did he resign his command until the 24th of May, near six weeks after. He continued, during that time, shamefully inactive in his winter quarters, notwithstanding, in the same letter which conveyed the leave to resign, he was ordered by his Majesty, “ whilst he continued in command, to lay hold of every opportunity of putting an end to the rebellion, by a due exertion of the force under his orders.” The only movement of any consequence, during that six weeks, is not mentioned in his letters; however, as this exploit ought not to be concealed from the public, I will relate it.

* See Parliamentary Register, 1779.

On the 19th of May, the Marquis de la Fayette, with the main force of Washington's army, from Valley Forge, crossed a bridge over the Schuylkill, and took post at Norrington. Intelligence of this movement was immediately communicated to the General. Pretending to shew a desire to do something before his departure, he marched out with a large part of his army, in two columns, as if he really intended to attack the enemy. The first column, unperceived and unsuspected, moved in a circuit round the enemy's post, and got perfectly in his rear, within sight of his corps, and considerably nearer the bridge, over which only the Marquis could possibly return, while the other column advanced towards the enemy's front. Thus completely entrapped, the Marquis gave up all as lost; he expected his retreat would have been instantly cut off. Washington, despairing of the safety of the flower of his army, immediately prepared to fly, with his remaining non effectives, baggage, and artillery, to be drawn by a few starved and emaciated horses, towards the Susquehannah; and nothing was wanting but a small share of military exertion, or, perhaps, inclination, to take or destroy the chief force of the rebel army. But here again, as at Brunswick, Trenton, Hillsborough, Brandywine, and German Town, the enemy was suffered to make a yet more fortunate escape. The first column, instead of pushing towards the bridge, in a good road leading to
it

it on the right, and cutting off the enemy's retreat, while the other should advance, and attack in front, was marched to the left, in a route more distant from the bridge, and thus, instead of intercepting the enemy, fell into his rear. The other column, under the immediate command of the General himself, *leisurely* advanced in front. The passage to the bridge was left open; and the Marquis, having recovered from his panic and despondency, made good his retreat, without loss, and unmolested.

The words "*orders to return*" are disingenuous, and evasive of the fact. They convey the idea, that the General was removed from his command contrary to his wish; when the truth is, that as soon as he had done *as little good, and as much mischief as possible*; as soon as he had depressed the spirits of the Loyalists, by his inaccessibility, his injudicious appointments, his neglect of them when rising in arms in his favour, and the indiscriminate plunder made by his army; as soon as he had revived, by his disgraceful attempts and retreats, that spirit of rebellion which he had so lately depressed; as soon as he had, by his manifest breach of military duty and the explicit orders of his Sovereign, sacrificed a British army; as soon as he had overcome the hesitation and reluctance of the House of Bourbon, and prevailed on it, by the indolence of his operations, openly and avowedly to support the rebellion; I say, as soon as he had,

with

with art and address, brought this load of ignominy on the British arms, and these accumulated evils on his country, and not before, he petulantly insisted on his resignation.

The reason assigned for his resignation is so indecent and groundless, that I will give it to the reader in his own words. “ From the LITTLE
 “ ATTENTION, my Lord, given to my recom-
 “ mendations, since the commencement of my
 “ command, I am led to hope that I may be re-
 “ lieved from this very *painful service*, wherein I
 “ have not the good fortune to enjoy the necessary
 “ confidence and support of my superiors, *but*
 “ *which, I conclude, will be extended to Sir Henry*
 “ *Clinton, my presumptive successor. By the return*
 “ *of the packet, I humbly request I may have his*
 “ Majesty’s permission to resign*.” In what this want of attention to his recommendations consisted, is not mentioned. If we look into the correspondence between the Secretary of State and the General, we shall not find it there; for in that it will appear, that if the General recommended a favourite to his Majesty, he was sure to receive promotion; and, to incite and oblige him, if honour conferred, and a sense of gratitude could oblige him, to do his duty, the order of Knight-hood was bestowed by his Sovereign on himself. And when we consider his wanton and extravagant

* See his Letter of the 28th of October, 1778, to Lord George Germain.

demands for more force, with the exertions made by Government to gratify him, we shall find, that his complaint of a want “ of the confidence and “ support of his superiors,” was made without the least foundation.

When the measures for reducing the revolted Colonies were resolved on, and the General was appointed to the command, such was the disposition of Government to gratify him in whatever he should desire, that the Secretary of State declared, “ the measures of force should be the wishes “ of the General.” The General, who was then in America, and had the state of the rebellion before him, was the best judge of the force which would be competent to its suppression; on his judgment, therefore, Government relied, and, instead of stinting, surpassed his wishes. In his letter * to the Secretary of State, after long and mature deliberation, he only requires 19,000 men, which, he says, will be “ adequate to an active “ offensive campaign on the side of New York “ and Rhode Island.” To combat this force, he “ apprehended the rebels would not have less than “ 10,000 men on the side of Rhode Island, and “ 20,000 men to act against General Carleton on “ one hand, and the New York corps on the “ other.” Instead of 19,000 men, he was furnished with 31,476; and although he expected to

* See his Letter of the 26th of November, 1775.

meet a force of 30,000 men, the whole rebel army did not amount to 18,000. With the force now sent, and which amounted to 11,000 men more than he required, the General appears to be more than satisfied, and declares his “ utter astonishment at the uncommon exertions” of Government; and yet, in his letter of the 25th of September, 1776, after he had defeated his enemy, and taken, killed, and dispersed more than half of his force, he begins his extravagant requisitions; and, with a manifest design to distress Government, he requires “ ten line of battle ships, with “ a number of supernumerary seamen, for manning boats.” Would any person suspect, that, at this time, the Admiral had 65 ships of war; 13 carrying from 50 to 70 guns, 28 frigates, and 34 sloops; and that the whole naval force of America was no more than three frigates and six sloops of war? To what use did the General mean to apply the additional “ ten ships of the line,” which could not be performed by the force already under his Brother’s command? Was it to batter down the fortifications of the rebel ports and harbours? We know they had none. Was it to penetrate up their shoal and narrow rivers, when he had so many frigates, and sloops of war, only proper for that service? Did he want them to defeat the truly contemptible naval force of the enemy, when the Admiral had upwards of 60 vessels of war under his command?

It will be as impossible for us to conceive to what use the General intended to apply the “supernumerary seamen.” His Noble Brother had not less than 12,000 mariners on board the ships of war and transports then under his command. Surely, out of so great a number, men sufficient might be spared to man his boats, at any time, and upon any occasion; and yet, notwithstanding the unreasonableness of these demands, more ships, and of a better and more useful size, than was asked, were sent over, viz. one ship of 44 guns, 10 of 32, one of 28, and one of 8 guns.

The General, page 41, acknowledges, that, when Mr. Galloway came over to the army, in December 1776 (which was on the first day of that month), “his great successes had intimidated the leaders of the rebellion, and nearly induced a general submission.” And indeed this confession, however unwarily made, was strictly true; for further opposition was universally despaired of by all America, except a few desperate men in Washington’s army, and that army was reduced to less than 3500 men. And yet at that very period, viz. on the 30th of November, he * makes an additional demand of 15,000 rank and file; and in his letter of the 20th of January, this demand is increased to 20,000; and he declares, that this

* See his Letters of the 30th of November, 1776, and the 20th of January, 1777.

number " would by no means exceed his wants ;
 " yet 15,000 will give us a superiority."

The reader will be as much at a loss to discover to what use the General would have applied this additional 20,000 men, as he has been in respect to the ten ships of the line. Both of these demands, when his force is considered, will appear equally extravagant and unnecessary. He had then, as appears by his own returns, 31,476 men, officers included, and the whole Continental force did not amount to 3500 ; and yet, in compliance with this extravagant and wanton requisition, so far as it was possible to be complied with, 7800 troops were, with all expedition, sent over to him.

The General, it seems, did not make this extravagant demand without assigning a reason for it. Reasons, or what he thought would carry the weight of reasons, were always at hand, when the Minister could receive no state of facts but by the packets under the General's command, and when all letters from America were liable to his inspection. Perhaps Government never committed a greater mistake, than that of suffering the line of intelligence, from countries where its servants are employed, to be taken out of the hands of the confidential officer. It enables its own servants to misrepresent the state of the country, the disposition of the people, the numbers of the enemy, and to put what gloss they please on their own misconduct,

misconduct, without a possibility of detection; and from these misrepresentations it has often happened, that men have met with applause, when, in justice, they should have received condemnation and disgrace.

But the reasons assigned were groundless and romantic. In his letter of the 12th of February, he informed the Secretary of State, that “ the rebels have prospects of bringing an army into the field of *more than* 50,000 men. They are most sanguine in their expectations, and, conscious that their whole stake depends upon the success of the next campaign, use every compulsory means to those who do not enter *voluntarily* into their service;” and yet, notwithstanding all this sanguineness of expectation, and these “ compulsory means,” we know, that, instead of “ more than 50,000 men,” they were not able to bring into the field, when the General met their force at Hillsborough, more than 8000; and even at the Brandywine not more than 16,000, militia included; after he had, contrary to all policy, given them two months to recruit their feeble army by every possible exertion.

It thus appears, that if the reinforcement sent fell short of the force required by the General, the expected reinforcement of the rebels, which was the reason assigned for that requisition, failed in a much greater proportion; more than one-half of the force required was sent, and not more than

one-fifth of that of the rebels was raised. The account of the force stood thus in 1777: British, 40,874 veteran troops; rebel regular army at Hillsborough, 8000; at Brandywine, 11,000; and, in the spring 1778, at the Valley Forge, not 4000 undisciplined troops. With what justice, then, can the General complain of his want of force, and how shameless and bare-faced is his attempt to throw the blame of his own misconduct on that Administration, which has, by such "uncommon exertions," thus gratified him in his extravagant requisitions!

Pages from 50 to 59 are employed in attempting to prove *that the people of America are almost universally disloyal, and that he did every thing in his power to encourage them to take up arms, without success.*

Here he asserts, that the "only attempt" made by a body of men, to assist in suppressing the rebellion, was in North Carolina, in 1776. Did the General never hear of two different bodies, who took arms in favour of Government, at different times, in the peninsula between the Delaware and Chesapeake? Did he never see, or hear of the proclamation issued by the Congress, to suppress them? If he did not, all America saw it, and the people of Britain may also see it. Did he never hear, that, in several counties above Albany, the Loyalists, being by far the greater number, prevented the disaffected from joining Gates,

when going against General Burgoyne? This was a fact known to thousands within his own lines. Did he never hear of the numerous offers made to Mr. Galloway, while the General was at Philadelphia, by the gentlemen of many counties, to take up arms, to disarm the disaffected, and to restore their respective districts to the peace of the crown? He certainly did.

“ The people of Staten Island, he confesses, “ (page 50) testified their loyalty by all the means “ in their power;” and General Tryon, and some other gentlemen, “ who had taken refuge on board “ ship, informed him of the loyal disposition of “ the people of New York and New Jersey, &c.” But it seems General Tryon, who had been many years Governor of the province, and the other gentlemen, who had lived long in New York, were all mistaken.

In order to account for the absurdity of his extensive cantonments, he acknowledges, it was to “ cover the county of Monmouth, *in which there* “ *are many loyal inhabitants.*” But here again the General found himself misinformed; Governor Tryon, and a number of other gentlemen of New York, had before, as I have mentioned, deceived him. And now General Skinner, whom he warmly recommends to his Majesty’s favour, who was the Attorney-general of the province, and from whom he must, or ought to have taken his information respecting the people of Monmouth,

was

was also mistaken. These gentlemen, it seems, knew little about the dispositions of the people of the country in which the most of them were born, and in which they had lived from their infancy; for, says he, “ *many, very many* of the people of “ Monmouth were taken in arms against us, with “ my protections in their pockets.” Had the General said *some*, and *but few*, of the people of New Jersey had acted in this manner, he would have been much nearer to the fact. Among the 6000 people who came in and took the oaths, some were, it may be reasonably supposed, disaffected; but even these, we ought to suppose, would have kept their oaths, had not the proclamation been shamefully violated on the part of the General. The plunder was so indiscriminate, and so excessive, that men were robbed of their all; and it was these disaffected men, made desperate by the breach of public faith, and injuries which they had sustained, who were taken in arms, with his protections in their pockets, and none others. Let Britons, for a moment, suppose, that the military, who were sent into the city of London to protect their persons and properties against the violence of the late mob, instead of affording them that protection, had robbed their houses, and polluted their wives and daughters; would they have tamely submitted to such outrages? Would their hearts have felt no disposition to oppose such enormous wickedness? Their sensibility will answer these questions.

questions. Indeed it is impossible for language to describe the mischiefs and disgrace which the want of discipline in the British army, in this respect, brought on the service ; and men who are acquainted with it, are surpris'd that it had not produced, what, from many circumstances, it is probable was intended, an universal revolt of all the Colonists.

As another instance of the disloyalty of the Americans, the General says, “ Several corps were offered to be rais'd, and were accepted, in the winter 1776, to consist of 6500 men ; but in May 1778, the whole number amounted to only 3609, including the brigades of Delancy and Skinner ; a little more than half the promised complement.” The gentlemen who offered to raise these corps, expected that the General would have opened the field for recruiting. When they look'd at his force, they saw it was practicable ; but they were deceived by the indolence and misconduct of the General. Brigadier-general Skinner's brigade was to have been rais'd in New Jersey. This province the General had shamefully given up. Brigadier-general Delancy's corps was to have been rais'd in the province of New York, which he expected would have been open to his recruiting parties. But the General contented himself with the possession of Long Island, Staten Island, and the island of New York ; and, moreover, suffer'd his enemy, who had not 6000 effective men, to harass and besiege

him in his quarters, during the whole recruiting season. When these facts are candidly considered, together with the small number of Americans within the British lines, the man of sense, who will reflect how few men in a society are willing to subject their persons to the dangers of war, and to military discipline, will be surprised at the numbers enlisted under such disadvantages, and within so small a compass of territory; and will confess, that it is a strong proof of the loyalty of the people.

At Philadelphia, the General insinuates that he had made the same experiment on the loyalty of the people. “ Mr. William Allen, a gentleman “ who was *supposed* to have *great family influence* “ in that province; Mr. Chalmers, much respected “ in the three lower counties on Delaware, and in “ Maryland; Mr. Clifton, the chief of the Roman “ Catholic persuasion, of whom there were said to “ be many in Philadelphia, as well as in the rebel “ army, serving against their inclinations, were “ appointed commandants of corps.” And what was the success of these efforts? He tells us, “ they “ only amounted to 800 men, including three “ troops of light dragoons, consisting of 132 “ troopers.”

All this is plausible in appearance, but fallacious in reality. It was the duty of the General to enquire after popular characters for these appointments; but he sought the most unpopular. Mr. Allen was a young gentleman, whose family influence

influence was considerable among the Republican party, before they subverted the proprietary government, and threatened to seize on the proprietary estate; but, after these circumstances took place, that influence was lost: he had been also a colonel in the rebel service, in the Canada expedition. I do not mention these circumstances to prejudice Mr. Allen, because I now believe him, from conviction, to be a loyal subject; but yet, a character thus circumstanced was not the person under whom the General could, in reason, expect the Loyalists would enlist. Mr. Chalmers, a gentleman from Maryland, who came into the British army at Elk, though much respected in Maryland, was unconnected, and without any influence, in Philadelphia. Colonel Clifton, if possible, had less influence, except among the Roman Catholics; and of these there were not 200 men capable of carrying a musquet: besides, here, as in New York, during the whole season for recruiting, he suffered Washington's parties and detachments to surround his lines, and render it impossible to recruit in the country. Such were the gentlemen appointed, and such the embarrassments under which the recruiting service laboured in Philadelphia; and yet the General acknowledges, that, during his short stay in that city, where he found only 4482 males from 18 to 60 years of age, of whom near 1000 were Quakers, he raised

974 rank and file, and, officers included, upwards of 1100.

The General says nothing of Mr. Galloway's troop of Philadelphia light dragoons; it did not suit his purpose. That very *unpopular* gentleman offered to raise a regiment of horse, but he could procure a warrant for raising a troop only. This corps was expeditiously raised; in two months they were complete, and so well disciplined as to be reviewed by the General, and greatly applauded for their discipline. It is known in that country, that his influence among the Loyalists was such, that he could have raised a regiment in nearly the same time, notwithstanding the embarrassments under which the recruiting service then laboured. But the General declined making use of Mr. Galloway's influence in the recruiting service, and preferred to it that of an unpopular country tavern-keeper, for whom he thought his servants in the kitchen the most proper company. This man received a warrant to raise a troop, and now mixes with gentlemen of rank in the army. Such were the judicious appointments of the Commander in Chief in Philadelphia!

To the charge, that no step was taken by the General to embody the friends of Government in New Jersey, who were anxious and desirous to be employed in disarming the disaffected, and in defending the country when the army should proceed in its other necessary operations, he answers,

Page 53.] “ *I never heard of the anxiety and readinefs here expreffed.*”

If the General never heard of the anxiety and readinefs here expreffed, it was becaufe he would not. It is a fact which I have mentioned before, and will here again repeat, that upwards of fifty gentlemen, of well-known principle and untainted loyalty, fome of them from the *disloyal county of Monmouth*, came into the lines of Trenton, with defign to offer their fervices in the before-mentioned meafures ; but the General was inaccessible ; they could not, after feveral days attendance, procure an audience. Some of them returned home, chagrined and difgusted, and others are now in New York, taking refuge under the protection of the King’s forces. But if the General had really the reduction of the rebellion at heart, why did he not fet up the King’s ftandard, and call on the Loyalifts of that country to affift him in arms ? Why did he reft on his proclamation, with promifing them protection, and then fuffering that promife to be violated in thoufands of instances ? Did he expect that the Loyalifts would impertinently offer their affiftance to a General who would not deign to ask it, and who fuffered his troops to plunder the inhabitants, to a degree more exceffive than ever was known, under a prudent General, in an enemy’s country ? Did he believe, that, by fuch meafures, he fhould attach even the well-difpofed to the caufe he was engaged in ? Did he imagine that it was
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possible to execute his trust, in reducing a country so extensive, without making use of the well-affected force in it, and whilst he was pursuing the most effectual measures to turn that force against himself? If he did, he acted upon principles contradicted by common sense, and the practice of all other Generals who ever deserved the applause and rewards of their country.

In page 54, the General next attempts to prove that the inhabitants of Philadelphia were not “*anxious* to promote the King’s service, even “*without carrying arms.*”

He tells us, that labourers were wanted, to construct the redoubts at Philadelphia; and he applied to Mr. Galloway to procure them. He presumes Mr. Galloway exerted himself; and yet, “with all his “affiduity, and the means made use of by the chief “engineer,” the whole number that could be prevailed on to assist him, amounted each day, upon an average, to no more than between 70 and 80.

This transaction, like every other mentioned in his Defence, is grossly misrepresented. Mr. Galloway was applied to, by the chief engineer, to procure the labourers. Near one hundred were immediately procured. The wages offered were 8 d. *per diem*, and a salt ration; but for these the men would not labour. The common wages in the city were from 5 s. 6 d. to 6 s. sterling *per diem*. Beef was sold at 2 s. 6 d. a 3 s. *per pound*; mutton at 2 s. a 2 s 6 d. cheese at 3 s. and bread at a price equally

equally high. The men had families to feed. The General was solicited to raise their wages, but he obstinately and inhumanly refused; the men deserted their work, and the officers declared they could not blame them. Very different was the conduct of Lord Cornwallis, when he applied to Mr. Galloway to repair the too long neglected dykes of the Province Island. Mr. Galloway recollecting the former conduct of the General, informed his Lordship, that he could not undertake the business, unless the men were to receive reasonable wages; and that he should ask no more than he had given for the like work in time of peace, although the price of labour was risen nearly two-thirds more. His Lordship replied, the work must be done, and, without hesitation, assented to the proposal. Near fifty men were immediately procured, at a Spanish dollar *per diem*, a salt ration, and a pint of rum; the latter, because they were obliged to work in water. The business was done in six days, much to his Lordship's declared satisfaction; and then, and not till then, could the chief engineer make any considerable progress in erecting the main battery against Mud Island fort.

In pages 59, 60, *the General endeavours to extenuate the plunder, and other enormities committed by the soldiery in America. He asserts, that "there never was less plunder, nor fewer enormities, committed by any army in the field;" and intimates,*
that

that the newspapers in America, like those of other countries, are the vehicles of invention and calumny, upon which these enormities are grounded.

I sincerely wish, for the credit of human nature, as well as for the General's credit, that this representation were just; but all, and more than I have said in my Letters to a Nobleman, respecting indiscriminate and excessive plunder, is known to thousands within the British lines, and to a number of gentlemen now in England; and in respect to the rapes, the fact alledged does not depend on the credit of newspapers. A solemn enquiry was made, and affidavits taken, by which it appears that no less than twenty-three were committed in one neighbourhood in New Jersey; some of them on married women, in the presence of their helpless husbands; and others on daughters, while the unhappy parents, with unavailing tears and cries, could only deplore the savage brutality. These affidavits are on record in America; and printed copies of them are now in London. Such were the measures pursued by the General, to reconcile his Majesty's deluded subjects to his government, and to encourage the Loyalists to support the cause of their Sovereign!

In page 61, *the General adduces the evidence of Major-general Grey, to prove that the Chesapeake expedition occasioned* " A POWERFUL DIVERSION IN FAVOUR OF THE NORTHERN ARMY."

How powerful this diversion was, the world already knows; it lost the very army it was intended to save, if it can be possible that such was the intent. But I will more particularly consider the force of the Major-general's evidence, in support of the fact alledged by the Commander in Chief.

“ *I think,*” says the Major-general, “ *a stronger diversion could not have been made, than that of drawing General Washington, and the whole Continental army, near 300 miles off.*”

From this mode of expression, the reader may possibly apprehend that Washington was drawn 300 miles more distant from the Northern army. But the Major-general could not possibly mean this; the fact being, that Washington was only drawn, except for a few days, from Quibble Town to the Schuylkill, 50 miles more distant; and, to perform this truly ridiculous diversion, he carried his army, by sea, at least 700 miles, against trade-winds, and, as he confesses himself, through a “ *very difficult navigation* *.” The consequences were foreseen by every man of common reflection. The carrying the main British force at so great a distance from the Northern colonies, inspired the rebels with new hopes and spirits, and contributed greatly to increase their numbers, under Gates, against the Northern army. It wasted two months of the campaign, destroyed many, and

* See his Letter of the 30th of August, 1777.

rendered the remainder of the British horses totally unfit for service; and occasioned the destruction of a number of vessels and stores, which, "it seems," could not be removed from the head of Elk*.

But to shew the folly of this extraordinary manœuvre, I will candidly lay before the public a true state of the British and rebel force at this conjuncture, and their respective positions.

General Burgoyne was on his route from Canada to Albany, where Sir William Howe was ordered to form a junction of the two armies.

Washington was at Quibbletown, 200 miles distant from the place where the Northern army must meet the enemy, and where it was taken; the General's force was at New York, 40 miles nearer, and in a manner between the Northern army and Washington.

Washington's army could not have passed to Albany by water; he had not shipping nor craft; nor could it have marched by land in less than a fortnight, and that only by one road, leading through a gap of the mountain. General Howe had an immense fleet of men of war and transports, sufficient to carry his whole force to Albany in *one week*.

Washington, when at Quibbletown, lay about nine miles from Brunswick, with his front on the Rariton, which, at that time, and in that place,

* Sir William Howe's Letter, October 10, 1777.

was not fordable, and his rear was accessible with ease. General Howe, at the same time at Brunswick, instead of marching to Hillsborough, on the south side of the Rariton, as if dreading his force, might have passed in a good road, on the north side, not more than 14 miles, and perfectly encompassed his enemy.

Washington's army was composed of new raised and undisciplined troops, commanded by inexperienced officers; they were a corps which had been defeated in every action, strangers to victory, and dispirited. Sir William Howe's army were Britons and Germans, perfectly disciplined, and commanded by brave and experienced officers, who had carried victory and conquest with them wherever they had trod, whose spirit had been exalted above the effects of fear by numerous and recent successes.

Washington commanded, by Sir William Howe's own exaggerated account, only 10,000 men; and, by his own returns, it appears he had under his immediate command, at New York, 40,784; and when we look at his own distribution of the force necessary for his garrisons, we find 7100 * sufficient for that purpose; so that 33,684 remained to be led against his enemy.

Upon this state of facts, it is natural to ask the following questions:

* Sir William Howe's secret Letter, of the 2d of April, 1777.

Did Sir William Howe imagine that he was taking the necessary measures to fulfil his orders to join the Northern army at Albany, by leading his own army round Cape Charles, 350 miles more distant from Albany than he was at New York ?

Did he really imagine that leading Washington, already 200 miles from Saratoga, from Quibbletown to the neighbourhood of Philadelphia, could possibly be a diversion of the least importance to the Northern army ? If Washington had intended to have co-operated with Gates against the Northern army, could Sir William Howe think that he should prevent it by hiding his army in the ocean, and by his circuitous route to the Cheapeake, going 600 miles from Saratoga, and leaving Washington within 200 miles of it ?

If the General really intended to prevent Washington from assisting Gates, why did he not take a post between them in New Jersey, on the only road and pass through which Washington could march ?

If he really intended to put an end to the rebellion, by defeating the main army in the field, why did he not lead 25,000 men from Brunswick, on the north side of the Rariton, and attack Washington's 10,000 men in his unfortified camp ? Or, if Washington had been so fortified and strong as to render an assault improper, why did he not, with such a superior force, surround, and, by cutting off his supplies, with which he was very scantily
supplied,

supplied, starve him? All these measures were pointed out by common sense. The benefits which would have accrued from them were obvious to all, and of the greatest importance to the suppression of the rebellion; while that which he pursued did not afford the least prospect of a single advantage to the service, and besides was attended with an immense unnecessary expence, was pregnant with numerous difficulties, risques, and dangers, and promised the ruin of the campaign.

Major-general Grey, in his evidence, further says, “ I do not think there was any *one object* which would have tempted General Washington to risque a general action so much as the fear of losing the capital of Pennsylvania.”

This I believe to be true: but, what does it avail in the defence of the General's conduct? Nothing. It contains a full condemnation of his Chesapeak expedition. For Washington would have fought between Hillsborough and that city from the same motive. He engaged Sir William Howe's army at Brandywine for that reason, and he would have done it in New Jersey. Why then did not Sir William Howe, having his boats and pontoons with him all prepared at Brunswick, pass his army from that place to the Delaware? If Washington had come from his pretended strong post to attack the British army, he must have fought his enemy upon equal, if not disadvantageous terms, as Sir William Howe might have chose his ground. If

he had remained in his camp, the city of Philadelphia, and all his magazines of military and other stores, must have fallen without opposition into the General's hands.

To the question, " Was there any probability of bringing the war to a termination that campaign, without forcing General Washington to a general engagement?" the Major-general answers, " Certainly not."

Here the General appears to be sensible of the great importance of bringing Washington to a battle. Why then did he not take one rational step to effect this purpose? Was it possible that he could imagine, that his taking post on the south side of the Rariton would bring an inferior enemy down from his advantageous post, across an unfordable river, to attack him? Why did he not march up on the same side of the river on which Washington lay, and offer him battle? Washington must have fought in a little time, or starved his army. Or, why did he not make a feint by passing towards Philadelphia? This must have brought Washington from his post, or he must have given up the " capital of Pennsylvania," for which the General himself believed he would fight. Surely any of these measures were preferable to the unpromising and unfortunate expedition round by sea to the head of Elk.

It will not be thought a digression, should I here give the reader a description of the great advantages

tages which a superior army must have over an inferior, in their operations in New Jersey. The province is bounded on the east and south by the North River, New York Bay, and the Ocean; on the west, by the Bay and River Delaware; and on the north, it runs into the uninhabited mountains, forming a peninsula to the south. The waters inclosing it on the east, south, and west, are not more than 50 miles distant from each other, and until the month of June are never fordable; nor even then, except in the Delaware above Trenton. And there are very few countries to be found, less difficult and better adapted for military operations. What then is the case of an inferior army in a country thus situated, when a superior force is properly led against it? If it should march to avoid its enemy southward, it runs into a snare from whence it cannot escape. If it turns to the north, it must combat every difficulty which mountains destitute of provisions can afford; and if he attempts either on the east or west to escape, he may be attacked in the moment of crossing a considerable river. And yet the General, by the indolence of his movements, although he had his truly contemptible enemy in this very country, suffered him to cross the Delaware with his heavy baggage and artillery in 1776; and in June 1777 shamefully retreated before him, suffering him constantly to harass the British rear from Brunswick to Amboy. And what was yet more absurd
in

in military policy, he left this scene of operations, so full of advantages to himself, and mischievous to his enemy, in order to draw him into a field more extensive, where none of them existed.

The Major-general further says, “ With the
 “ force Sir William Howe had under his com-
 “ mand, I think, if General Washington had a
 “ wish, it was for him to have gone up the North
 “ River.”

This is only matter of opinion, and altogether ill-founded. Washington dreaded the army's passing up the North River. He knew too well the difficulties he must have to encounter in following it. He knew the British army would be transported with ease, and in a short time, by water; and that his own must march over mountains, and through ravines and strong defiles; and that he must receive his provisions from the southern Colonies. And he also knew, that it would depress the spirits of the eastern militia, prevent them in a good degree from joining Gates, and infallibly save the northern army. Such being his fixed opinion; when it was suggested to him that Sir William Howe was gone to the Chesapeak, he would not believe it, and contended that the measure was too absurd to be possible. Agreeably to this opinion he acted. When Sir William Howe with the fleet sailed from the Hook *southward*, Washington moved his army from Quibbletown *northward*, in order to be more conveniently situated to follow
 the

the British General up the North River. He believed the sailing from the Hook to be a feint, and expected each day that he should hear of the General's return, and of his sailing with his army towards Albany. And as soon as he heard that the British fleet was at the Capes of Delaware, and not before, he marched southward; but upon receiving accounts that the fleet had again flood out to sea, still persuaded that Sir William Howe could not act so contrary to reason and obvious policy, as to go up the Chesapeak to Philadelphia, and that he would yet go to the northward, he returned to his northern post, which he did not leave until it was perfectly ascertained that the British fleet was near the head of Elk. This conduct of the rebel General agreed with his declared sentiments, and proves the reverse of the Major general's opinion.

Page 62.] “ *My reason for going by sea fully set forth in my Narrative, page 16.*”

The only reasons assigned by the General to his Sovereign, in his letters, were the difficulties he should meet with in crossing the Delaware. To these I have already replied. Since that letter, he has discovered a number of others, equally ill-founded; and for these I am referred to the Narrative.

Page 16.] “ *To have attacked Washington in that strong post (Quibbletown), I must necessarily have made a considerable circuit of the country.*”

The utmost distance of this circuit would not have exceeded fifteen miles, about six miles further than to Hillsborough. Neither Quibbletown nor Hillsborough is ten miles from Brunswick; so that this *considerable circuit* of country might have been performed in one day. A circuit which will bear no comparison with the one he adopted in its stead, and which he took by sea and land, to fight Washington at Brandywine on ground equally strong.

Page 16.] “ *I did not think it adviseable to lose so much time as must have been employed in that march during the intense heat of the season.*”

The time which would have been lost in that march could not have been more than ten hours;—the time wasted in his Chesapeak circuit was three months.

Ibid.] “ *Exclusive of this consideration, our return must have been through an exhausted country, where there was no possibility of keeping up the communication with Brunswick.*”

The reader, by this account, may be led to think that Quibbletown is one hundred miles from Brunswick, when in fact it is but ten at most;—and the communication might have been as easily kept up with Quibbletown, as with Hillsborough;—and besides, as Sir William Howe had only 11,000 men with him, he might have had as many more to have secured the communication if he had wanted them.

In my Letters I have asserted, that “ in the
“ middle of victory the ardour of his troops was sup-

“ pressed ;” and the General supposes, page 62,
 “ that the author alludes to his conduct near the
 “ lines of Brooklyn, and introduces the evidence
 “ of Lord Cornwallis and Major-general Grey
 “ to disprove it.” Here the General is mistaken.
 I did not allude to his conduct at Brooklyn, but at
 the Brandywine, Goshen, and at Germantown.
 Men of the first reputation for candour and integrity
 at New York declare, that this was also the case
 at Brooklyn and the White Plains ; but, as I
 have not treated of the General’s conduct at those
 places, I shall take no further notice of his
 evidence.

In the Letters, I have said, “ that at Brunswick,
 “ Lord Cornwallis was upon the heels of the ene-
 “ my ; the destruction of a bridge over the Rari-
 “ ton saved them only for a few hours ; their
 “ further security was owing to the orders received
 “ by that nobleman to halt at Brunswick.”

To disprove these facts, he again, page 65,
 refers to the testimony of Earl Cornwallis. On
 this testimony I shall make no remarks ; but con-
 tent myself with only observing, that the facts I have
 alledged are ratified not only by the universal re-
 port of the country, but by the General’s own
 letter of the 20th December 1776, written at the
 time when the transaction happened, to give just
 information to his Sovereign, whom he ought not
 to have deceived, and when the General did not
 think of his Defence. And therefore I presume,

the Public will give full credit to it. The words of the letter are :

“ In the Jerseys, upon the approach of the van
 “ of Lord Cornwallis’s corps to Brunswick, by a
 “ forced march on the first instant, the enemy
 “ went off *most precipitately* to Prince Town; and
 “ had they not prevented the passage of the Rari-
 “ ton, by breaking a part of Brunswick bridge, *so*
 “ *great was the confusion among them, that their*
 “ *army must inevitably have been cut to pieces.*”

“ *My first design extending no further than to get*
 “ *possession of East New Jersey, LORD CORNWALLIS*
 “ HAD ORDERS NOT TO ADVANCE BEYOND BRUNSWICK,
 “ WHICH OCCASIONED HIM TO DISCONTINUE
 “ HIS PURSUIT.”

Here every fact I have alledged, and which the General has denied, stands fully confessed by himself; and when it is known that the Rariton is fordable at Brunswick at every recess of the tide, no man can doubt but the spirit and activity of his Lordship would have led him, had not his orders been--“not to
 “ advance beyond Brunswick,” to have pursued, an enemy thus precipitately “flying,” thus ready to be
 “ cut to pieces,” and having so “*difficult*” a river to pass as the Delaware.

The advantages which must have been derived from continuing the pursuit were so critical, so momentous, and obvious, that we cannot suppose that an Officer so active and enterprising, and who had pursued his enemy more than 90 miles, reducing their numbers from 18,000 to 3,000 men,
 would

would have discontinued his pursuit at the moment that enemy had before him all the difficulties of crossing a considerable river.

Page 67.] *Washington's force at this time (when he was followed to Trenton) consisted of 6000 men, exclusive of Lee's corps of 4000; General Washington lost no time in crossing his artillery and heavy baggage over the Delaware at Trenton, before we could move from Brunswick. He also crossed part of his troops, keeping a corps on the east side to observe our motions.*

This paragraph contains three mistakes; one of them, I trust, the General himself will confess. He here says that Washington's force consisted of 6000 men. In his Narrative, page 8, he acknowledges that force to be only 3000 when it attacked Colonel Rhial at Trenton. He also asserts that Lee's corps consisted of 4000 men. In his letter * to the Secretary of State, giving an account of Lee's capture, which happened only a few days before, he says it consisted of 2000 men. These contradictions in his opinions, at the time he was writing to the Secretary of State, and when he is making his defence before the Public, the reader will be at no loss to account for. However, the truth is, that Washington, by his own returns made on the day before he crossed the Delaware, had no more than 3300; and a number of these deserted immediately after. Lee's corps did not

* See his Letter, dated Dec. 20th, 1776.

amount to 1500; and on his capture, many of them deserted; so that when Washington made his great, and what many thought would be, his last effort to recover his desperate affairs, he could only bring over against Colonel Rhal 2800 men, ordering Cadwallader with his brigade of 500 men to cross the Delaware, and to attack Bordentown, where only 80 Hessian grenadiers were left by Colonel Donop. The ice in the Delaware prevented this intended manœuvre. And yet Sir William Howe suffered Washington with this army, then the whole Continental force of America, to take from him all East and West Jersey, except his posts on the Rariton, and that too at a time when he confesses in his Narrative, page 41, that his “*great successes had intimidated the leaders of the rebellion, and nearly induced a general submission.*”

Nor is it a fact, that “Washington lost no time in crossing his artillery over the Delaware at Trenton before we could move from Brunswick.” Washington believed that the British General had no design of moving his army from East to West New Jersey. Upon what Washington’s belief was founded, I know not. But it is certain, that he acted as if he was acquainted with the General’s first intentions. That he had, if we may credit his own letters to Congress now in Britain, copies of returns of the British army, is a fact. It is therefore highly probable, this resolution might *inadvertently* transpire through the same channel. Possessed with this belief, Washington

ton did not leave Princeton until the British van was within three miles of it. Nor had he prepared boats at Trenton to transport his army over the Delaware. The same boats which Lord Cornwallis says, in his testimony, " he had hopes of finding at Coryel's Ferry," did not get down to Trenton until late in the same night that the British army *slept* at Princeton. And therefore it was, that Washington did not begin to transport his baggage and artillery over the Delaware, until twelve o'clock that night; and could not get his baggage and troops over, until a few minutes before the arrival of the British army*, which had loitered seventeen hours within twelve miles of Trenton. For this confidence of Washington in the indolence of the British General, his principal officers who were not in his secret councils blamed him. And it was upon this occasion that Weeden, a rebel General, wrote the letter I have mentioned in page 48 of the Letters to a Nobleman, declaring, " that General Howe had a mortgage on Washington's army for some time, but had not yet foreclosed it."

It is also a mistake, that Washington " crossed a part of his troops over the Delaware, keeping a

* See Sir William Howe's Letter, 20th Dec. 1776. The truth is, the last rebel embarkation had not left the Jersey shore when the British van appeared in sight. And a Mr. Samuel Morris, one of the rebel officers, whose servant was taken, made his escape on horseback, because he could not reach the last boat.

“ corps on the east side to observe our motions ;”
no corps was crossed over until the morning of the
day on which the British army took up their quar-
ters at Trenton.

Page 66.] “ *The troops of the left column were*
“ *not in their cantonments in the evening of the march*
“ *to Princeton until dark, and those of the right*
“ *column not till some hours after dark.*”

How illusive is this ! I have asserted that the
army arrived at Princeton at four o'clock in
the afternoon. This fact the General does not deny ;
but to evade it, we are told, when the two columns
were settled in their cantonments. How long it was
before the two columns were in their cantonments,
I know not ; perhaps the same indolence prevailed in
cantoning the army as in the other operations.
But that both the columns were British troops, per-
fectly relieved from fatigue by their stay at Brunf-
wick, and zealous for action, and either of them
superior in numbers to the flying and panic-struck
enemy, are truths that cannot be concealed or
evaded. And therefore it is evident, that they
easily might have overtaken, in the course of seven-
teen hours, the enemy, who were within twelve miles
of their quarters, and that in the very act of cross-
ing the Delaware ; that river, of which the diffi-
culties in crossing have been so magnified to serve
another purpose.

Page 67.] *The cause of not marching earlier the*
following day was, that the enemy had broke down the
bridge

bridge which could not be sooner repaired, and rendered fit for the passage of artillery.

This bridge was over a creek which an English hunter would leap with ease. It was within a mile of the British head-quarters, its banks sloping to the water's edge with the gentlest declivity, and fordable at the high-road, and in twenty other places within half a mile of it. The bridge itself, which was only used occasionally by the inhabitants on heavy falls of rain, might have been repaired in one hour, and at four o'clock in the morning as well as ten o'clock in the day—there was nothing to prevent it. There are people now in London perfectly acquainted with this formidable bridge and creek.

Ibid.] *To account for his not crossing the Delaware after his reduced and panic-struck enemy, at a time when he had brought the country nearly to a "general submission," he again refers to Lord Cornwallis's evidence, who tells us, "as the Delaware was not fordable, and we could get no boats, it was certainly impracticable."*

That the Delaware could not have been passed at this time without boats or rafts, is true. But the General must tell us in his rejoinder, why he did not construct rafts or pontoons, which might have been done in a few days with the materials in Trenton *. This is a question to which the Public

* See Mr. Galloway's Examination, p. 42.

has a right, and will expect, a satisfactory, and not an evasive answer; especially as the crossing the Delaware at this time was most critical and momentous, and must have put an immediate end to the rebellion.

At this time, the models of Government in the rebel States were scarcely formed, and their authority by no means established. Every member of the rebel State of New Jersey had fled out of the province; and the Congress themselves, with the utmost precipitation, had also fled from Pennsylvania into Maryland. A universal panic, with a desire of immediate submission, then prevailed throughout all North America. Washington's army was reduced to 3000 men. The city of Philadelphia was distant no more than two days easy march; it was intirely defenceless; 3000 British might have been spared to have taken immediate possession of it; while the other, and by far greater part of the British army, might have been employed in the final destruction of the rebel force and magazines. The British fleet, or such a part of it as might be thought necessary, with transports loaded with stores and provisions for the army, might have sailed round in one week, and, without a single obstruction*, have passed up to Philadelphia, which every circumstance demon-

* At this time Mud Island fort was not built, the chevaux-de-frize and chain were not made, nor were their fire-rafts or water-guard in any kind of force.

strated to be the most comfortable and most proper quarters for the army in winter. Had this measure, which plain common sense so evidently dictated, been pursued, the reader will determine, whether that country, which the General has incautiously confessed, was, by the previous successes of the British arms, brought “nearly to a general submission,” would not have ended the rebellion, preserved the Northern army, prevented a war with France and Spain, saved the millions which have been expended, and preserved the nation from those imminent dangers and distresses which lately threatened the Independence of the British nation.

[Page 68.] *The General again adduces the testimony of Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Osborne, to vindicate his conduct in having taken Trenton into the chain of cantonments, and for posting the Hessian troops, with the 42d regiment, there and at Bordentown, under the command of Colonel Donop.*

Here he attempts to evade the force of the charge against him. I have not censured his conduct for “taking Trenton into his chain of cantonments.” Seeing he *would not* cross the Delaware, this was a prudent and necessary measure. It was necessary to cover New Jersey, which he had then conquered, and might have been secured, had he taken one proper step for that purpose. There is not, therefore, a sentiment in the Letters that can bear this meaning: I have only blamed

him, *imo*, for giving the command of his frontier cantonments to foreigners, who did not understand the language or policy of the country ; and *2do*, and principally, for leaving the weakest command, or fewest number of men, next to the main force of the enemy, and the strongest and greatest command where there was no enemy to fear.

The reader will here permit me to refer him to a perusal of Lord Cornwallis's evidence, where he will find, that no fact, which his Lordship asserts, tends to contradict any of the charges in this paragraph ; all that he says, relates to the covering of Trenton, which certainly was judicious and necessary. But had his Lordship been consulted on the quantum of force which ought to have been left at Trenton, or upon the expedience or propriety of placing foreigners in the frontier posts, I am confident he would have advised against either of those measures ; and had he been asked by the General, whether the greatest or weakest force ought to have been placed in the frontier cantonments, he would, without any hesitation, have advised the greatest.

Page 69.] *Sir George Osborne, whose evidence I have mentioned, tells us, that, after the misfortune of Trenton, Colonel Donop acquainted him, that if Colonel Rhal had executed the orders he had delivered him from Sir William Howe, which were, to erect redoubts at the post of Trenton, that his opinion was, it would have been impossible to have forced*
Rhal's

Rhal's brigade, before he could come to his assistance from Bordentown.

If this was the declaration of Colonel Donop, as we must suppose, inasmuch as a gentleman of Sir George Osborne's established credit has declared it, it can only convince us, when the real facts are known, of the impropriety and ill policy of placing Hessian commanders in the advanced and most dangerous post, with a command so weak, to oppose the whole force of the enemy. The truth is, that Colonel Donop, when Trenton was assaulted and taken, was drawn down to Mount Holly, twelve miles distant from Bordentown, and eighteen from Trenton, with his whole corps, except 80 grenadiers, contrary to the information and advice received from Mr. Galloway. This gentleman told him, that the enemy's force at Mount Holly, which he supposed, from the information he had received from a number of the disaffected, who had grossly imposed on him, to be 3000 men, were no more than 450, men and boys, prevailed on to make a show, and to draw him from his post, while Trenton was attacked. This information the Colonel disregarded; the consequence of which was, that Colonel Donop was not at Bordentown, from whence he could support Colonel Rhal; and therefore Colonel Donop told Sir George what was not a fact, to apologise for his own unmilitary conduct.

But if the Colonel had received orders to direct Colonel Rhal to fortify Trenton, one would imagine the General had taken the same precaution in respect to Bordentown. And yet we know that Colonel Donop acted the same indiscreet and un-military part with Colonel Rhal, and indeed worse; for he left his post, although equally exposed to the enemy, who had boats to cross their whole force over, to the assault of either post, then unfortified. Washington was not unmindful of these military blunders, and therefore sent his contemptible body of new raised militia, most of them boys, to draw Colonel Donop from his post, while he should attack it, as well as Trenton; and nothing saved Bordentown, at the time Trenton was taken, but the ice in the Delaware, which prevented a corps of 500 men, under Cadwallader, from passing that river.

Had Colonels Donop and Rhal received orders from the General to fortify their respective posts, is it credible that officers of their rank and experience would have presumed to disobey them? I should think not, when their own safety and honour depended on their obedience. If Colonel Donop had received such orders, it was his duty to have seen them executed; if he did not, why did not the General call him to answer for so great a breach of duty? Why did he afterwards intrust a man, who had transgressed the military law in a point so
important,

important, and which had brought disgrace and ruin on the British service, with the important command against Red Bank? But there are other questions, to which we may call on the General for explicit answers. Were the orders to Colonel Donop in writing, or not? If they were in writing, why are they not produced? If they were not, they certainly ought to have been, in a matter of so much consequence. But further. Why did not the General see that those redoubts were built, before he withdrew his force from Trenton? If they were necessary at all, they were immediately necessary. The assaults upon Trenton might have been made the next day after the enemy had left it, as well as the eleventh. The General, with his whole army, remained on the spot, from the 8th to the 14th of December*; and in half of that time the redoubts at both posts might have been completed, and the subsequent disgraces and misfortunes, to the British service, prevented. The General, therefore, must yet find a better apology for those two blunders; of leaving his frontier posts, which were the most exposed, and in sight of the whole force of the enemy, in a state altogether defenceless, and with the smallest number of troops of any of his cantonments; blunders that would disgrace the weakest officer in his army.

* See his Letter to Lord George Germain, of the 20th of December, 1776.

Ibid.] *Washington, after Lee's corps joined him, had never less than 8000 men.*

General Lee was taken, on the 12th of December, by Colonel Harcourt, at the head of his corps, near Trenton, on their way to join Washington. A few days after the scattered remains of that corps, not consisting of 700 men, joined Washington, who, reinforced by that corps, attacked Trenton; and the General confesses, in his Narrative, page 8, when he intends to throw the blame on Colonel Rhal, for suffering Trenton to be taken, that "he was *credibly* informed, that "the numbers of the enemy did not exceed 3000;" but in his Observations, when he has another purpose in view, he asserts, that Washington had never less than 8000 men, after the junction of Lee's corps. The General did not recollect, at the time he made use of this argument, that it proves too much for his own reputation; and that, if it vindicates it in one case, it more strongly condemns it in another. For if Washington's force "was *not less than 8000*" men, when he left Trenton with only 1200, under Colonel Rhal, in a state entirely unfortified, to oppose that 8000, did his military knowledge lead him to believe that the post of Trenton was safe? Did it justify his not seeing that post in a state of defence, at least for one day, before he left it; before he drew the main British army from it? I wish some reflections, yet more to the General's disadvantage than those

those I have yet enumerated, may not obtrude themselves upon the mind of the candid enquirer into his conduct. If there were 8000 men within sight of the defenceless post of Trenton, did General Howe intend to sacrifice that post to the wicked designs of a faction, combined against the honour of his Sovereign, and the happiness of his country? Or shall we impute it to his ignorance in military service?

But yet even this excuse his friend Major-general Grey will not suffer us to admit. He declares, page 96, that the “division of the army, “before the battle of Brandywine, was a *masterly* “*movement, deceived the enemy, and brought on* “an action with almost certainty of success;” we cannot, therefore, impute so gross a blunder to ignorance. The reader will ascribe it to another cause.

I have asserted, in page 61 of my Letters, that Washington was encamped at Quibbletown, about nine miles from Brunswick, with fewer than 6000 undisciplined and badly appointed troops, which, with a corps of 2000 men, under General Sullivan at Prince Town, composed his whole force. To this the General answers,

Ibid.] From the intelligence I then had, and which I have not since had reason to doubt, Washington had not less than 10,000 men in his camp, on the hill above Quibbletown.

The General shews no want of ingenuity in stating his own numbers, and those of his enemy.

In treating of the former, he gives us only his effective rank and file, exclusive of officers, an important part of his force; but in speaking of the rebel army, he always extends his ideas to its whole force. This is artful, and ingeniously adapted to mislead men unacquainted with such calculation. However, allowing him what he contends for, and supposing that he had "11,000 fighting men," and Washington 10,000, yet the former were veteran troops, inured to victory, and eager for action; and the latter were new raised and undisciplined, and at least one-half militia*. Was he afraid of attacking Washington with such men? If he was, why did he not add to their numbers 11,000 more? His own returns will prove, that the numbers then under his immediate command, were not less than 35,000.

Page 70.] *His (Washington's) camp was to the full as inaccessible in the rear as in the front, and an attack upon his right flank (from every account I could get) would have been still more hazardous.*

The surveyor of the county, who knew the spot on which Washington was encamped, was at New York when the General proceeded to Hillsborough; he was attending on the army to render his services. He had drawn a chart of the roads round Washington's camp; and he communicated

* It will occur to the Reader, that Lord Cornwallis, with less than 2000 veteran troops, has lately defeated, and totally routed, 7000.

his ideas to General Skinner, who had constant access to the General. He was ordered to hold himself in readiness to attend the army in Jersey; but he was left at New York, without any notice of its movement to Hillsborough. Of these facts, whenever called upon, he will make solemn affidavit; and further, that Washington's camp was accessible both in the rear and on the right flank, on higher and more commanding ground.

Ibid.] Washington was certainly induced to believe that my intention was to attack him; and had he not been perfectly satisfied with the strength of his post, he would not have remained so long in it.

It was impossible that Washington could conceive, from the movement of the British army, that the General intended to attack him. It did not in the least indicate such design, but manifestly the reverse; indeed, it rather discovered a fear in the General, of an attack from the rebel army. Could Washington, when General Howe, with all the appearance of caution and fear, in his whole march from Brunswick to Hillsborough, and during his stay at that post, kept the Rariton, an unfordable river, between him and the post of his enemy, a situation from which he could neither attack nor be attacked, possibly believe he intended to attack him? It was this unmilitary conduct which encouraged Washington to remain in his camp, because he knew he was safe while Sir William Howe remained thus posted. Had the General wished

to have induced Washington to believe he intended to bring on an action, there was one obvious and infallible mode of doing it. A march of five or six miles would have carried the army to Washington's right flank or rear. It would then have been posted between Washington and all his resources; it would have cut him off from his magazines of provision, his military stores, and his boats, then lying some within seventeen, and all within thirty miles of the British post. In this case, Washington must have deserted his camp, or starved; and if he had moved, the General might have attacked, or pursued him to his boats, to which the British army would have been many miles nearer than Washington, as he must have taken a considerable circuit to have reached them, and to have avoided an action, supposing it to have been practicable. But instead of this manœuvre, the General did not move his army towards the Delaware, far enough to induce a belief that he intended either to cross it, to get in the enemy's rear, or to cut him off from his supplies.

From page 71 to 96, *the General has introduced the testimony of Sir Andrew Snape Hammond, to apologize for not going up the Delaware, when he arrived with his fleet at the Capes of that Bay.*

It would be a tedious talk, and little entertaining to the reader, should I travel through all the mistakes contained in this testimony, respecting
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the numerous “ shoals, and rapidity of the tides” in the Delaware; the force of Washington at Willmington; the narrowness of the channel at Newcastle; the difficulties of landing the troops, and the great strength of the rebel water-guard.

I will, therefore, content myself, because I trust the reader will be satisfied, with a few brief and general observations on the whole. The *shoals* are to be seen in Fisher’s chart of the Delaware. *The tide* does not run two miles and an half in an hour, As to the *narrowness of the channel* at Newcastle, every skilful mariner, who has sailed up the Delaware, knows, that from the Pea-patch below, to Marcus Hook above, that town, a distance of 20 miles, it is at least two miles in width. The strength of Washington, at Willmington, was perfectly visionary; because it is known he was not at that time in Pennsylvania: And there are a number of gentlemen, now in London, who can prove that the fort at Mud Island was in an unfinished and defenceless state, and possessed by 130 militia only; that the water guard was unprepared and unmanned, and the chain not finished; and that there are a variety of places between the Bite of Newcastle and Marcus Hook, perfectly adapted to the landing of an army with the utmost ease. Of this, Sir Andrew, in his cross examination, notwithstanding all the imaginary difficulties he had before enumerated, makes a full confession; for, in page 87, he candidly declares, that he “ never pretended to deny the practicability of landing an
5 “ army

“ army in the Delaware.” But, to put this matter beyond dispute, I need only remind the Public, that the same fleet which Sir William Howe has endeavoured to persuade us would be in danger from the difficulties in the navigation, and the rebel force, by his own orders, shortly after, when Washington had possession of the country on both sides, did sail up the same river *uninjured and unmolested*, and in less than half the time it had taken to sail up the Chesapeake, and Washington’s troops were in possession of both banks of the river, when the water-guard was prepared, and in complete force.

Pages 104 and 105 are partly employed in an attempt to prove there was no time lost in stopping the banks of Province Island, to enable the workmen to erect the batteries against Mud Island.

To support the charge of neglect, I shall apply to the General’s own declarations; by which it will appear, that the city of Philadelphia was in the General’s possession on the 26th of September*, and that the batteries were opened against Mud Island on the 15th of November, exactly seven weeks after †. What were the carpenters and working parties employed in during this time? We are told they were repairing the dykes, and stopping out the tides. If the engineer employed them in that labour, when he had liberty to pro-

* See Sir William Howe’s Letter to Lord George Germain, of the 10th of October, 1777.

† See Observations, p. 105.

cure artists, he was very absurd. This business is a particular art, and to be performed only by experienced men. Their wages are from 7 s. 6 d. to 10 s. *per diem*, while the wages of an upland ditcher is only 2 s.; and I have known a master artist sent for from Virginia, and paid 150 l. *per annum* salary. Hence it was that the carpenters and working parties, if they were employed in repairing the dykes, laboured in vain, in a business that they knew nothing about; but the truth is, they were as fruitlessly employed in mud and water, to erect the batteries. This occasioned the application to Mr. Galloway, by Lord Cornwallis, who, as is before mentioned, had them repaired in six days. The number of men employed by him, were upwards of forty.

An attempt is made, in page 106, to vindicate the General's conduct, in not attacking the rebel army at White Marsh. "*I had, says he, the best intelligence that the enemy's post was not affailable in the rear.*"

The guides who attended the General in this truly ridiculous expedition, and who lived from their infancy on the spot, and many others, will prove, on oath, that the ground in Washington's rear commanded his camp; and it is not less true, that he was prepared, at a moment's notice, of the General's movement towards his rear, for flight. His heavy baggage was sent off toward Skippack, and his light was in readiness for a precipitate

cipitate movement. Men of undoubted reputation, within his lines at the time, have confirmed these facts.

But the General here again calls to his aid the testimony of Major-general Grey, who says, “ I think an attack on the enemy, so very strongly situated as they were at White Marsh, would have been highly imprudent.” Did the Major-general ever reconnoitre the rear of Washington’s camp? Was he ever on, or near that ground? He does not assert it; and the truth is, he never was. May he not then have been mistaken in his opinion? He in the next page as positively asserts, that the war was carried on, “ in the strongest country in the world, with almost an unanimous people to defend it;” and in both of these opinions, there are now but few men who do not know that he is grossly mistaken.

I have said, that the General “ supinely suffered himself to be surprised at Germantown.” To disprove this charge, we are referred to Sir George Osborne’s testimony; and, when we candidly examine what he has said on the subject, we find it rather supports than disproves it. All that Sir George has said in favour of the General, is, that he ordered him to move in front of the line of infantry; and told him, he “ might expect the enemy at day-break.”

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This only proves, that the General had some suspicions of the enemy's design ; but not that he had, in consequence of that suspicion, given the necessary orders to the army, to prepare them for receiving the enemy, and to prevent a surprize. If he really believed he should be attacked, he is yet more culpable than I had imagined ; for it is evident, from the testimony of his own witness, that no such orders were given. Four different questions were put to Sir George, in order to draw from him his opinion on the surprize of the army ; all of which he declined to answer. If he did believe the army was not surprized, would not his honour, and the justice due to the General, have induced him to have declared his opinion ? And, as he declined it, is there not what amounts to the strongest presumption, that he could not deny it without violating his honour and the truth ? But if the General really gave the necessary orders to the several officers of his army to prevent a surprize, all his Aides de Camp, and his Secretary, were in London during the examination of his witnesses before the Committee of the House of Commons, why then did he not prove such orders by them ? His honour, his military character demanded it ; and yet we find he has prudently avoided to examine them on the subject.

In the Letters to a Nobleman, page 86 to 89, I have faithfully described the distressed situation of the rebel army at the Valley Forge, and charged

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the General with a high breach of his duty to his Sovereign, in not attacking or besieging it, and by that means saving his country from all its subsequent misfortunes. As this is a high charge, the Public will excuse me if I repeat it at large, and then consider his answer.

“ Here” (at the Valley Forge) “ Washington
 “ lay all the winter and spring, encountering dif-
 “ ficulties which language can scarcely describe.
 “ His army labouring under bad appointments,
 “ almost in every respect ; his troops in a manner
 “ naked, in the most inclement season of the year,
 “ having no salt provisions, and little salt to eat
 “ with their flesh ; often on short allowance in re-
 “ spect to both ; rapidly wasting by sickness, that
 “ raged with extreme mortality in all his different
 “ hospitals, and without any of the capital medi-
 “ cines to relieve them. His army was likewise
 “ diminished by constant desertions, in companies
 “ from ten to fifty at a time ; hence in three
 “ months his number was reduced to less than
 “ 4000 men, who could not, with propriety, be
 “ called effectives.

“ Washington’s army continued in this weak
 “ and dangerous state from December till May ;
 “ while the British troops, who had the best ap-
 “ pointments, and were in high health and spirits,
 “ lay in Philadelphia, in a great measure inactive,
 “ suffering the rebels to distress the loyal inhabit-
 “ ants on every side of the British lines, to destroy
 “ their

“ their mills, seize their grain, their horses, their
 “ cattle; imprison, whip, brand, and kill the
 “ unhappy people, who, devoted to the cause of
 “ their Sovereign, at every risque, were daily sup-
 “ plying the army, navy, and loyal inhabitants
 “ within the lines, with every necessary and luxury
 “ that the country afforded.”

To the charge thus made, with so many circum-
 stances precisely defined, the General, as upon many
 other occasions, contents himself with making only a
 general answer. He does not presume to deny
 one of the facts I have asserted; he does not deny
 the description I have given of the weakness of the
 enemy's camp, and of its lines and redoubts; of
 its numbers of men; of its truly distressed state,
 arising from the want of comfortable lodgings, of
 provisions, and of clothing; or of the constant de-
 sertions, and extreme mortality raging among his
 troops. All these facts he gently glides over in
 silence, and artfully rests his defence on the fol-
 lowing naked assertion: That

Page 106.] “ The Author's plan of besieging
 “ the enemy at the Valley Forge, is in the highest
 “ degree absurd. Had I made a division of the
 “ troops in the manner he proposes, I should have
 “ exposed them to be beaten in detail.”

Surely this cannot be deemed a satisfactory an-
 swer to those numerous facts, should I say nothing
 in reply; however, fatigued as I am with the dis-
 agreeable task of refuting so many positive asser-

tions, and such numerous misrepresentations, I cannot pass it over in silence. On my reader's account, as well as my own, I will be brief. The reader will see, in the Appendix, a genuine letter from a Committee of Congress, appointed to examine into the causes of the distressed state of Washington's army, and sitting at the Valley Forge at the time I have mentioned. It is signed *Francis Dana*, one of the Committee, in behalf of the rest, directed to the President of the Congress, and indorsed in the hand-writing of Mr. Laurens, the then President, from whose trunk, among other interesting papers, it was taken; the authenticity therefore cannot be disputed. From this letter, it will appear that I have been modest in my description of the distresses of Washington's army; I trust I have been so in every other piece of information, which I have, from the best of motives, given my country; and I cannot help acknowledging, that I esteem it a fortunate event, that I am thus justified in a particular which carried with it a greater degree of improbability than any other that I have communicated to the public.

Having perused this letter, the reader will recollect, that the General had under his immediate command near 20,000 veteran troops; that his enemy had not 3000 men, who could with propriety be called effectives; that these were in a manner destitute of almost every necessary; and that he had not horses to carry off his cannon and
military

military stores. What, then, could prevent the General from marching out with 5000 men, and attacking this enfeebled, sickly, and naked enemy, thus destitute of provisions? Was he afraid that 5000 veteran Britons would be beaten “in detail” *by such an enemy?* Why, then, did he not take his whole army (as there was at that time no other body of men in arms on the whole continent of America), and attack, or surround, and starve him into a surrender, agreeably to the plan I have mentioned in the Letters*? Could any thing be more practicable? Did not every sense of military duty, the recent loss of the Northern army, and the critical state of affairs at that time in Europe, all urgently press him to take this measure? Had this been done, the honour of his country, shamefully lost at Saratoga, would have been regained; all the valuable artillery, and military stores of the continent, would have fallen into his hands. The Congress, seeing their whole force taken or dispersed, must have desponded of further opposition; all America must have submitted; and the Court of France must have seen the folly of its new alliance, and receded from it; and thus the General might have saved his country from all its present difficulties, embarrassments, and distresses.

* See Letters to a Nobleman, p. 89, and the chart, showing the position of the rebel army, and of the posts proposed to be taken by the British.

If there was not a want of inclination, why was not this done? The General cannot plead want of perfect knowledge of the despondency and weak state of his enemy. If he wanted charts of Washington's quarters, and his redoubts and defences; several of them were brought in to him by men of credit, who took them on the spot. If he wanted intelligence of the state, position, or movements of the army, he received it constantly from officers, and other persons confidential in every department of the enemy's army; besides his constant intelligence from deserters, spies, and the people of the country, daily coming into his lines. In short, there was no movement, or other material circumstance that happened, but what the General was soon acquainted with. The state and condition of the rebel army was as much before him as before Washington himself.

It has been problematical with many, what motives could lead an officer, whose reputation stood high in the opinion of his Sovereign and country, into all this misconduct. The humane and charitable impute it to his real ignorance in his own profession. But these men have taken only a superficial view of the General's actions. His plans of the battle of *Long Island* and *Brandywine*, are irresistible proofs that, when he intended to gain an advantage over his enemy, or even to cut off his retreat, he possessed military judgment sufficient

ent to insure it. At both of these places, he knew, that if he had been defeated he must have lost his army. Had his troops been routed at Long Island, he could not have escaped in boats to his ships, when pursued by a victorious enemy. Thus circumstanced, his military abilities were exerted; nor would his manœuvres have disgraced a general of the first abilities; he turned his enemy's left flank, unsuspected, by a circuitous route, and killed and took prisoners one-third of his army. At Brandywine, when he thought his fleet had left him, and he had no safety but in victory, his measures were equally judicious; he suddenly, and unperceived, hemmed in the whole rebel army between his two columns and impassable waters. In short, he was never defeated, nor compelled to retreat; and always succeeded in every attack he thought proper to make, as far as he chose to succeed; knowledge, therefore, could not be wanting, whenever inclination called it into action.

There are others, and but few, who imagine that the war was procrastinated from lucrative views. But from this charge I readily acquit the General. His disposition is liberal; and his particular friends acknowledge, that the love of money is the least of all his passions; and therefore, although he suffered his favourites, while he was profusely wasting the wealth of the nation by *his inaction and extravagant demands*, to collect much

of it into their own coffers, yet little of it found its way into that of the General.

There are others, who, having carefully examined *the conduct of the General in America*, and compared it with *the proceedings of a wicked faction in Britain*, are convinced that the design of both was *the same*; and that the General, instead of accepting the command with an intention to execute the trust reposed in him by his Sovereign and his country, accepted it *by the advice*, and *with design* to facilitate the wicked purposes, of his confederates in Britain. I sincerely wish there were no ground for such a conclusion. But there are circumstances so strong, and actions which speak so loudly in support of it, that, when examined, they will amount to positive proof. Indeed, it is impossible to trace his conduct, by fair and just arguments, from any other motive.

A private letter from Mr. Samuel Kirk, of Nottingham, one of the General's constituents and colleagues in faction, with his answer, is before the Public*. Mr. Kirk charges him with a breach of promise, in accepting of the command of the forces about to be sent to America *for suppressing the rebellion*; tells him of the "confusion it had made among his friends;" gives his reasons against it; and concludes with saying, "I do not

* See the detail and conduct of the American war, and the Appendix to this Reply.

“ wish you may fall, *as many do*, but I cannot say
 “ *I wish success to the undertaking.*” To this confidential and truly *sedition letter*, the General returns an answer as confidential. He tells Mr. Kirk, that “ he had flattered himself he had removed all
 “ *those prejudices* he had entertained against him;”
 “ that he had been *highly complimented*,” upon his accepting the command, by those who are “ *averse*
 “ *to the measures of Administration;*” and “ intreats
 “ him in particular *to suspend his judgment*, until
 “ the event should prove him *unworthy* of his support.”

These letters, which were not intended for the public eye, surely furnish us with a clue to the dark and heinous conspiracy of the Faction, with which the General was connected. From them it appears, that, before these men had concerted their plan of opposition, he had pledged his honour to his constituents, that he would not accept of a command which was to *suppress the rebellion*; and that notwithstanding, he was led by some, we must suppose, powerful motive, to violate his promise.

What that motive was, is likewise sufficiently evident. It was the advice of the men who were thus “ *averse to the measures of Administration,*” whose “ *compliments*” he immediately received on accepting the commission, whose *approbation* he pleads as an excuse to his friend for his breach of promise, and of *whose public reputation* he was the constant and careful guardian while in America,

rica *. And it further appears, that after he had received his command, to remove the “*prejudices*” of his particular friend, who had declared “*he could not wish him success*” in *suppressing the rebellion*, “*to suspend his judgment*” on the General’s conduct, “*until the event should prove him unworthy of his support.*” Upon these plain

* It is an anecdote as true as it is curious, that, when the General was at Philadelphia, a Loyalist was about to publish a piece reflecting on the conduct of the Minority in Parliament. The General by some means heard of it: upon which Mr. Galloway received the following billet from his Secretary:

“*Captain M’Kenzie’s compliments to Mr. Galloway; the General desires he will be pleased to enquire into the authority by which Mr. Towne publishes his Evening Post, and to make any regulations he thinks necessary to suppress political pieces, which may have an evil tendency, from either of the presses, as it is hinted, that some of this stamp are designed for publication.*”

Mr. Galloway, engaged in other business, neglected to perform the duty recommended by this billet, not knowing the immediate urgency nor the *extreme importance* of it; and the piece was published. The Secretary came down to Mr. Galloway, much vexed, and complained of the Printer. The Printer was sent for by the Secretary, and *reprimanded for this heinous offence*; and the Author of the piece was told, that the General would not suffer *such pieces* to be published. This anecdote, however trifling it may seem, fully proves, that the General held himself bound to preserve the conduct of the Opposition to his Sovereign’s measures, from the *rude strictures* of the Loyalists within his lines; and, for that purpose, even to make use of the power vested in him by his Majesty; although that very Opposition was constantly holding up to the view of the people, the conduct of the servants of the Crown, and even of Majesty itself, in terms the most opprobrious and insulting.

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facts the Public will determine, whether there is not satisfactory proof of a resolution in the General to co operate with the design of a Faction, who were averse to that measure, a design as unconstitutional as it was wicked ; and which was nothing less than to wrest from their Sovereign his constitutional right to appoint his confidential and executive servants (a right which, by the constitution of the British government, is as firmly established in the Crown, as that of electing representatives in Parliament is fixed in the People); to compel him to turn out the present Administration; and *to put his own person, his family, and his crown, into the hands of these conspirators.*

To accomplish this design, all their powers were to be united and exerted. One great line of conduct was to be adopted ; Administration was to be proclaimed the authors of all the national misfortunes ; and their measures, however honest, wise, or necessary to the honour and safety of the empire, were to be opposed and obstructed in Parliament, and the execution of them defeated, if possible.

Men's actions are the strongest proof of their secret designs. If we examine the conduct of the Faction in Britain, we find that it has strictly corresponded with *these preconcerted measures.* The American rebellion was an event, which these men thought would furnish them with all the means necessary to the accomplishment of their design. They saw it would call for the exertions of Govern-

ment, and that those exertions would afford a large field for opposition. The real rebel, who wished to overturn the government, and the hungry patriot, whose lust could only be satisfied by power and places, united therefore in fostering and supporting it. And, lest the wisdom of the rebel colonists should fail in their plans, the measures of sedition from time to time were concerted, and transmitted, by the Faction in Britain, to their confederates in America. “ The non-importation agreement, the
 “ union of the Colonies, and the meeting of a Con-
 “ gress; a solemn league and covenant, under oath,
 “ not to purchase the manufactures of Great Bri-
 “ tain, and to make an *united and invincible stand*
 “ *against the British Government,*” were all mea-
 sures which originated in Britain, and were adopted in America.

Whilst these secret intrigues against the State were carrying on with the rebels in America, the measures of Government at home were loaded with the most opprobrious epithets. The steps which were taken to support the dignity and authority of the State over the Colonies, were called a “ *cruel,*
 “ *tyrannous, and ruinous system of policy.*” And those which were adopted to subdue the most unjustifiable and obstinate rebellion, were styled “ *an*
 “ *unjust and ruinous war.*” Every engine was in motion, and every seditious scribbler was employed to poison the minds of the people, and to render the measures of Administration odious in the eyes of the nation. Those misrepresentations and
 false;

·falsehoods, which they thought would most readily captivate the vulgar, were industriously propagated. The presses poured forth their pamphlets and occasional pieces, to shew the distressed state of the kingdom, the decrease of its inhabitants, the immense debt and poverty of the nation, the want of the resources of war, the impossibility of raising the necessary aids, the lawfulness of American opposition, and the injustice and cruelty of the war; which, it was boldly asserted, was intended, by the councils in which their Sovereign immediately presides, to introduce despotic power in the Colonies. Nor were these doctrines confined to Pamphlets and News-papers. They were the constant themes of inflammatory declamations in both Houses of Parliament.

Having, by these seditious measures, raised the popular clamour against Government, and prevailed on a considerable part of the deluded people to support them; having distracted the councils of the State, and induced them to treat with rebels, and to offer to give up the most essential right of the supreme authority, *the right to tax those Colonies which it was bound to protect*; they advised their colleagues in sedition in America, to reject the propositions, as “*unreasonable and insidious.*” And these opprobrious epithets were transmitted from Westminster to Philadelphia, and echoed back from the Congress to Westminster again. And afterwards, when, through their private intrigues, they had sacrificed the Northern Army, involved their country in a war

with France, thrown the nation into a general despondency, and compelled Administration to offer to the rebels terms of accommodation, little short of independence itself; their object not being as yet secured, their ambition ungratified, the loaves and fishes unobtained, and the firmness and virtue of their Sovereign not yet conquered, they dreaded the prospect of accommodation and peace with America; and therefore they advised the leaders in rebellion to reject even those terms; assuring them, *that Administration could not support the war, and that they must soon grant to them independence.* How happy is it for Britain, that these seditious men were mistaken, and that the Congress pursued this foolish advice! foolish in respect to the views of Congress, as well as those of the Faction in Britain!

They weakly imagined, that his Majesty, alarmed at the prospect of a war with France, and of the loss of America, would change his confidential servants, and receive into his bosom those men who were the sole authors of those distresses; who, when in office, by their seditious counsels, had laid the foundation of the rebellion, and, through its whole progress, had encouraged and supported it; who had enjoyed the first offices of the State; and whose honour, integrity, and abilities, when weighed in the balance, had been found wanting; men who had avowedly opposed every measure which his Majesty had wisely projected to support the authority of the State, and the independence of the nation.

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But, finding that his Majesty met all the distreffes, which these conspirators had brought on their country, with a virtuous firmness, which baffled their expectations, they determined to proceed to yet more insolent and violent measures. They resolved, in their secret cabals, to impeach his confidential servants, and by that means to wrest them from his service. Such impeachments were impudently and boldly threatened in the great council of the State. While they were thus bringing their plot to maturity in Britain; while the natural resources of this country were cried down, to the great encouragement of our foreign enemies, and a national despondency in a manner effected; while the Faction was strenuously advising, and zealously contending, in both Houses of Parliament, for withdrawing the troops from America, and at the same time opposing every measure which was necessary for the recovery of the revolted Colonies; their arch-agent, the General, with honourable fidelity (for, in some men's opinion, there is honour even among the conspirators against the public weal), was taking every step to procrastinate the war; to plunge the nation yet farther in debt, and a more general despondency; and to render Administration more odious to the people. We have seen, that, although by his "great successes" obtained in less than four months, by only one half of his force, he "had nearly induced a general submission" of the rebels; yet, by his

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indolence and inaction, he procrastinated the war during the space of sixteen months longer, and left the rebellion in more spirits than when he began his operations. He suffered his enemy, with less than 3500 men, to reconquer a province which he had lately reduced;—he suffered that enemy to besiege his whole army in its quarters;—he wantonly wasted the season of military operations, giving his enemy time to recruit their reduced force. By various measures, he continually depressed the spirit of loyalty, and always declined to avail himself of its assistance. He alternately sunk and revived the spirit of rebellion, always taking care not to reduce it. He often met his enfeebled enemy, and as often, with his vastly superior force, retreated before it; and, with an unaccountable versatility, adopted one plan after another, always choosing that which was most *expensive to the nation, and ruinous to the success of his own operations.*

In addition to all this, with a strict consistency of design to waste the public money—to render the nation tired of the American war, and hopeless of success,—and to multiply the difficulties of Government in carrying it on; we have seen him, in proportion as his enemy's strength and resources decreased, constantly increase his *wanton, unnecessary, and extravagant demands for more force*, until, conjunctly with his colleagues in faction at home, he had laid the foundation of a war with France and Spain. This done, he immediately resigned.

That

That the Faction, or the General, incapable of feeling for the distresses of their country, intended to involve it in a mischief of so great a magnitude, while it was embroiled in a war with its Colonies, charity forbids me to determine; although their insatiable lust for power, and thirst for the emoluments of office, with the general tenor of their conduct, would perhaps even justify such a decision. However, this is evident, that, upon the General's arrival in Britain, with a large retinue of his confidential friends, who were to be the vindicators of his shameful conduct in America, the Faction received him in their arms, and boldly vindicated his conduct both in and out of the senate. Their force thus collected, they conceived that their plot was brought to its wished-for maturity. They prepared for, and loudly threatened, impeachments and the block. But, previous to this measure, the whole censure and odium of the miscarriages of the American war, of which they themselves had been the authors, were to be cast on the servants of the Crown. To effect this, anonymous charges against the General were carried into Parliament, and his character was to be vindicated in the great councils of the State, and no where else. In vain did the officers of Government, to whom he was alone accountable, declare, that they had no accusations against him. Instead of petitioning their Sovereign for a Court-martial, the only proper court by which he could

be tried, they instituted an unprecedented examination in the House of Commons, under the pretence of *vindicating the General*, when their real design was to *condemn the conduct of Administration*, and to prepare the way for their threatened impeachments.

In this examination, they hoped to run alone. For a time they did so; but at length their secret design appearing evident, Administration was called on to vindicate the measures of their Sovereign. Many gentlemen of undoubted reputation, perfectly acquainted with the conduct of the war, and the state of America, were summoned to give evidence respecting them. Of this the Faction was apprised. Only two witnesses were examined. But such was the credit and force of their evidence, that the Faction shrunk from the enquiry; the great council of the nation was convinced, that the conduct of Administration, in respect to the American war, stood clearly justified; and the deep-laid plot of the Faction was totally frustrated.

Such has been the conduct of the men, who, in exact imitation of their confederates in America, have, by their specious and false clamours for liberty, been seducing their unwary and too credulous country to the brink of ruin! And such are the evils, in which they have, by their cabals, with unabating industry, involved the nation! When will Britons, the most wealthy, the most
free,

free, and the most happy people on earth, discern their own good! When will the voice of wisdom teach them to support those measures, and that power, which alone can preserve their freedom and independence among nations! When will they cease to be the instruments of faction, and the unhappy dupes of lawless ambition!

Time has been, when the Princes on the throne have paid no regard to law, and broke over the sacred bounds of their happy constitution; when they have deprived the worthiest men, without law, of their personal liberty, and robbed the people of their property; and when they would have extended the prerogative to the utmost bounds of arbitrary power. How different, at this day, is the situation of Britons! They have a Sovereign on the throne, into whose heart a wish never yet entered that interfered with the happiness of his subjects; who never yet received a farthing from his people without their consent; who, instead of attempting to extend the prerogative, has, of his own accord, given up a part of that prerogative to secure the rights of his people;—a Sovereign, who, when the distresses and necessities arising from their own folly and seduction, lately compelled them to put unlimited confidence and power into his hands, to save the capital city of their kingdom from immediate destruction, and the nation itself from ruin, exercised it with more than parental lenity; and, having complied with the wishes of the virtuous

part of the nation, and saved his country from confusion and ruin, instantly, with a virtuous generosity, gave it up;—a Sovereign, whose heart-felt wish, if we may judge from the whole tenor of his conduct, is, to preserve their constitution of government inviolate, and to support its *independence*, its *dignity* and *glory* among nations; to recover the lost dominions of the State; and to reduce his faithless and perfidious enemies to justice; which there can be no doubt of his effecting, if not obstructed by the folly of his people, and the lawless and seditious views of a Faction, which has too long distracted his councils, and prevented the exertions of his power. And yet too many Britons, fascinated by the specious arts and delusive wiles of those political impostors, are constantly giving them their support, in opposition to the truly patriot measures of their Sovereign; sacrificing their own happiness at the altar of lawless ambition, and precipitating the most powerful and beautiful fabric of civil liberty remaining on the globe, to its final ruin.

A P P E N D I X.

No. I.

To Lieutenant General Sir WILLIAM HOWE, K. B.

SIR,

HAVING, in the preceding sheets, travelled in much haste through your laboured Defence, permit me to pass from the disagreeable, though too often necessary, office of an accuser, to that of vindicating the accused. I hoped, that, as a gentleman, you would have followed, in your Observations, the example I had set you in my Letters; in which, with as much delicacy of language as truth would possibly admit, I had confined my strictures to your "professional conduct," without suffering one syllable of personal abuse, or one hint at the defects in your private moral character, however fair the mark, to escape from my pen. But in this hope, on your own account, I am sorry to say, I am disappointed. Considering Mr. Galloway as the Author of "Letters to a Nobleman;" and wishing, by defaming his personal character, to lessen his credit; and that the impositions on the
Public,

Public, in your Defence, might more readily pass for truths; you desert the field of decent and manly argument, and take a mean refuge under the abuse of his private reputation. A conduct of this kind can need no comment; it can have no weight with a candid and sensible Public; it is the usual practice of the guilty, and the common weapon made use of to wound the innocent.

You do not venture to accuse him of, although you strongly insinuate his disloyalty:—You deny his influence in the province he lived in:—You boldly charge him with giving you false intelligence; and you meanly condescend to boast of your liberality towards him. Now, although no man can perceive what relation these matters can possibly have to a vindication of your “professional conduct,” I shall, on Mr. Galloway’s account, examine them.

To give a gloss to your insinuations respecting his disloyalty, you say: “This gentleman, in the beginning of the rebellion, was elected a Member of Congress.” What, Sir, does this prove to your purpose? It is well known to the Public, that many gentlemen, who had before, and have since, given the most demonstrative proofs of their loyalty, were elected by the then constitutional Assemblies, and sent to the first Congress, with the most laudable and loyal designs,—to accommodate the alarming controversy, to establish a

more

more permanent union between the two countries, and to stop the rising sedition. This was exactly the circumstance of that gentleman, who refused the delegation on any other terms*. His Instructions are long since before the Public, and prove the fact; and it is known to many gentlemen now in London, from Pennsylvania, that, while in Congress, he faithfully pursued those Instructions †, uniformly exerting his influence and abilities to carry them into execution. That he, boldly, and unawed by the dangers which threatened his person, in the tumults of riot and faction which he was opposing, reprobated and condemned every measure which tended to sedition, and a separation of the two countries. That when he found he could not stem the torrent of rebellion, he returned to the Assembly; and there again, as the ultimate measure he could pursue, to save the province he lived in, he resolutely exerted his influence to induce them to disapprove of the measures of Congress, and totally to secede from all connexion with it. That having failed in this measure, on the question, by one vote only, he was again elected a Member of the second Congress, contrary to his own solemn and repeated refusals to serve. That he continued thus elected until long after that Congress met; but as he did

* See Mr. Galloway's Examination, p. 47. &c.

† See Appendix to Letters to a Nobleman,

not attend, another was elected in his room. And yet such was the earnest desire of the Congress to obtain his influence and concurrence in their measures, that Doctor Franklin came up to his seat in the country, to which he had retired, to solicit his union with them, and offered to procure his immediate re-election; all which he resolutely refused. And afterwards, that, although his life was repeatedly threatened by the independent faction, and while his friends trembled for his safety, he, unawed by his danger, condemned in his publications the measures of Congress, and charged them with views of independence and treason, at a time when they publicly disavowed them. Could it be possible for the candour of the Public to ask for further proof of this gentleman's uniform fidelity to his Sovereign, and attachment to the legal constitution of his country; his having abandoned a very valuable estate, and sacrificed the independent happiness of his family to those principles, must certainly be that proof.

But you further add, “ When my Brother and
 “ I, in the character of his Majesty's Commis-
 “ sioners for restoring peace, published a *procla-*
 “ *mation of indemnity, for all those who had taken*
 “ *part in the rebellion, provided they should sur-*
 “ *render themselves, and subscribe a declaration*
 “ *of allegiance within a limited time, Mr. Gal-*
 “ *loway was among the first who came over to us*
 “ *from PHILADELPHIA ;*” thus intimating that he
 * had

had taken part in the rebellion, and came over to you to take the benefit of the pardon offered by the proclamation. Now, Sir, although this is all invention, I do not suspect it is your own. I wish, for the sake of your own character, to believe it to be that of your venal dependant, whom you have long since amply rewarded for writing your Vindication; for you know you was not, where you ought to have been, with your army at Brunswick, when Mr. Galloway came over to it, but in New York; and, should I descend to follow your example, of attacking private reputation, I could, perhaps, inform the Public what *allurement* led you thither. However, as this is a practice of which I disapprove, I shall not adopt it, although your own conduct has justified it. But, Sir, the real truth is—Your proclamation is dated 30th November, and was not published within your own lines at Brunswick, in New Jersey, near 60 miles distant, from Philadelphia, from whence you say Mr. Galloway came, until the day following; and on this very day, early in the morning, he was within your lines, with General Vaughan, in Brunswick. Driven from his family, by an order of the Convention at Philadelphia for the imprisonment of his person, he left Pennsylvania on the 28th, two days before the date of your proclamation, and eleven days before one of them was sent to the province he left; for you may recollect, that those proclamations were not sent to Pennsylv-

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vania

vania until after your arrival at Trenton, on the 8th of December, when your Aid de Camp requested Mr. Galloway to send fifty of them to Philadelphia; which he accordingly did, by a person on whom he could depend. I have mentioned General Vaughan, who, I have no doubt, will recollect the time of Mr. Galloway's coming into Brunswick, and that he was the first who shewed to him the proclamation. Thus, Sir, you will perceive into what a dilemma you have brought yourself, by trusting to the invention of one who was with you at New York, and could know nothing about the time when Mr. Galloway came over to your lines. But, if you really thought Mr. Galloway "had taken part in the rebellion," why did you afterwards appoint him to so many places of high trust and importance in his Majesty's service, giving him an opportunity daily to betray it? How can you account for a conduct, so inconsistent with your manifest duty, either to your Sovereign or Country?

You next meanly descend to mention your liberality to Mr. Galloway. Mean, indeed, it will appear, when that gentleman's services and sacrifices are considered, had it flowed from your private purse; and yet meaner still, when it is known you paid it out of the public money. And how much did this profuse liberality amount to? No more than 770 l. in which the wages of a clerk are

*

included,

included, by your own account, for services performed during 18 months.

And what were the services he performed? He acted as Superintendant of the Police, which he digested, regulated, and established, at your request. In this office was included the preservation of the order, internal peace, and safety of the first city in America. He served you as Superintendant of the Port; an office established to receive an account of all the cargoes imported for the use of your army, and the people within your lines, and to prevent their being clandestinely carried to the enemy. He served you as Superintendant of the prohibited Articles. In this office the utmost care and attention was necessary, to prevent the enemy from being supplied with them. He also superintended every avenue of your lines, and nightly received the reports of persons appointed to attend them. He was constantly employed by you, from the time of your arrival at the head of Elk, to the day of your resignation, in obtaining for you intelligence of the state and movements of the enemy; and gained more important and better intelligence for less than 500 l. than you paid for at New York, as your friends confessed, upwards of 5000 l. He was often applied to by the Commissaries and Quarter-masters, for his advice and assistance in procuring forage and provisions for your army. He was incessantly called on to furnish you with guides and

horses for your parties. He raised a troop of light horse, and embodied eighty loyal volunteers, who served without pay or clothing ; performing, under his own direction, those many and uncommon services mentioned in a note of his Examination, page 80. He also furnished you with many maps, delineating the roads for the march of your army ; and a principal one, with all the roads between the Delaware and the Susquehannah, either drawn by himself, or under his immediate direction ; with a variety of other services, totally independent of his public offices ; which, had they been done by your favourite officers, would have cost you ten times the amount of the whole sum of your profuse liberality to him. Such are the services of Mr. Galloway, which you have not had the honour to mention. Your liberality, and those services, are now before the Public, to whose candid reflections both are submitted. I shall only remark, that, had you dealt out the public money, committed to your charge, with the same œconomy to your favourites, as you did to this gentleman, we should not have seen so many American Nabobs rolling in wealth, and luxuriously living on the spoils of their country, as have lately returned from America.

In respect to Mr. Galloway's popularity in the provinces in which he had lived, it is too well ascertained by a variety of facts too notorious to be affected by your negation ; but as the charge
of

of his want of influence does not injure his private and moral character, I shall say no more on that subject.

Of a very different nature is your next and last charge. You say, You “ at first paid attention to his opinions, and relied upon him for procuring you secret intelligence; but you afterwards found your confidence misplaced; his ideas you discovered to be visionary; and his intelligence was either ill-founded, or so frequently exaggerated, that it would not have been safe to act upon it.” If these assertions be truths, why did you continue constantly to employ him in the line of intelligence, to the day of your resignation? Why was your Aid de Camp almost daily coming down from you to him, desiring him to send out for intelligence? Why did you not altogether rely on your “ other channels of secret communication?” How unaccountable then must it appear to men of sense, that you should be so weak as to continue to trust a person, whose “ ideas you had discovered to be visionary,” and whose “ intelligence to be ill-founded, exaggerated,” and false?

But you further add, “ Having once detected him in sending me a piece of intelligence from a person, who afterwards, upon examination, gave a very different account of the matter, I immediately changed the channel of secret communication, and, in future, considered Mr. Galloway as a nugatory informer.” How dark and

and unmanly is this charge! Against charges so general, so perfectly undefined, and so artfully made, it is impossible for the most innocent person to vindicate himself; for you have prudently avoided either mentioning the person who "gave" a very different account of the matter," or the matter itself. Can you believe, that this stab in the dark, at a private character, will not be condemned by the candour and good sense of the Public? It will soon, Sir, appear, that, to the last hour of your command, you entertained a high opinion of Mr. Galloway's honour and probity. Did you at the time, or during your command in America, give him the least hint of your suspecting the intelligence he sent you? Had you done this, he would, in all probability, have convinced you that he did not deserve your suspicion, if, in reality, you ever entertained one; he might have convinced you of his having received the intelligence from the person who denied it, and that this person had deceived you. This would not, Sir, have been the only instance in which you were deceived. One I will beg leave to remind you of, in which your favours and confidence were totally misplaced. Mr. Willing, and his partner Mr. Morris, had been, from the beginning of the rebellion, the agents of the Congress for supplying their naval and military stores. Their disaffection to their Sovereign, and their rebellious principles, were proved by a number of letters, intercepted by
your

your Noble Brother ; and therefore Mr. Galloway called on Mr. Willing in Philadelphia, by your exprefs order, to take the oaths of allegiance ; and although he refufed, yet he found fo much favour in your fight, as to obtain a countermand of that order, and a difpenfation from taking the oath ; and even after this, you made him and his flour-broker, Mr. Brown, your confidential negotiators with the Members of the Congress. The rebel records will fupport this truth ; and further, that both Mr. Willing and his notable broker deceived and betrayed you.

However, dark and infidious as this charge is, it is fortunate for Mr. Galloway, that there is proof abundantly fufficient to convince the unprejudiced, that all you have afferted refpecting his difloyalty, his unpopularity, and deception, is of recent invention, and had no exiftence in your mind when you left America ; it is proof which you yourfelf will not deny the credit of, being no lefs than the testimony of Sir William Howe himfelf, under his own hand, and the feal of his arms.

Six days only before you left Philadelphia, imprefsed with the faithful fervices of Mr. Galloway, you not only warmly recommended him to the attention of your fucceffor, but wrote to him the following letter :

S I R,

“ S I R, Philadelphia, May 18, 1778.

“ T H E *salutary effects* of the regulations in the establishment of the police in this city, have so fully justified my choice of the gentlemen in whose hands I placed the *important trust*, that I cannot, *either as a public or private man*, withhold *this testimony of my sense of their services*; and I beg, that, to the *general respect* paid you, as an *upright, able magistrate*, and *friend to the legal constitution of your country*, I may be permitted the honour of adding *my particular assurance of the great personal esteem* with which I am,

S I R,

Your most obedient,

humble servant,

W. HOWE.”

Joseph Galloway, Esquire.

Now, Sir, permit me to ask :—If Mr Galloway was *disloyal*, how could you give him your testimony that he was “ a *friend to the legal constitution of his country?*” If he was *unpopular*, how could he possess “ *the general respect as an upright magistrate?*” If he had *deceived you*, in giving you false intelligence, why could you not very justly, “ *either as a public or private man, withhold your sense of his services?*” And, if he was *unworthy of your confidence*, how *unworthy* was it in Sir William Howe to give him *particular assurances of his great personal esteem?* These are paradoxes which we must leave to be unfolded in
your

your next attempt to vindicate your conduct in the American war.

Such was your opinion of Mr. Galloway when you left America, and such it continued to be for some time in England; for you was the first gentleman, your own and your Noble Brother's Secretaries excepted, who paid him the honour of a visit on his arrival in London. Nor was it changed the day before his examination in the House of Commons, on the conduct of the American war; for you well remember, that, on that day, your Noble Brother, who was pleading in your defence, and therefore we may presume spoke your sentiments, delivered, when Mr. Galloway was present, an high, though fulsome panegyric on his honour and integrity. But how changeable and uncertain are the good opinions of men! Mr. Galloway being examined, the film which had before inverted his Lordship's optics, and represented Mr. Galloway as a man of integrity, became suddenly removed; and from that instant he stood metamorphosed from an honourable man into "Shakespeare's apothecary;" and now, by the same magical influence, you have transformed him from a man worthy of "general respect as an upright magistrate," into one of no popularity; from an *upright man*, into a *deceiver*; and from a "friend to the legal constitution of his country," into a *rebel*.

November 10, 1780.

THE AUTHOR.

No. II.

*Copy of a Letter from SAMUEL KIRK, Grocer,
in Nottingham, to General HOWE.*

SIR,

I CANNOT easily describe the discontent and disappointment which appears among a very great number of your constituents here, on account of your having accepted a *command in the expedition against our American brethren*. From the opinion I had of your integrity in general, I voted for you at the late election, notwithstanding you had, in some recent instances, acted contrary to my sentiments. I took the liberty to tell you so, and asked you the following questions, viz.

Whether you thought our whole army would not be insufficient *to conquer America?*

If you did not think *the Ministry had pushed this matter too far?*

Whether, if you should be appointed to a command, you would refuse? And,

Whether you would vote for the repeal of the four Acts of Parliament, which *you are now going to enforce?*

If I am not mistaken, and I believe that you will allow that I am not, *you answered to every one of these Queries in the affirmative*. This, out of pure regard to your interest here, I have made known

known to *numbers*, who were in the same state of suspense with myself, as to the propriety of our conduct at the election; and it has served to remove, in a great measure, the ill *impressions*, by which you yourself was *very sensibly* affected while among us.

We are however assured, that General Howe is preparing to embark *for America to enforce the Acts*. Judge, if you can, the confusion this occasions among your friends. The most plausible excuse that is made among us, is, that the King sent for you, and what could you do?

Now I must beg leave to say, that I think you might have acted the part of a *great man*, in refusing to go against this people on many accounts. But to say nothing of politics, your Brother died there. They have shewn their gratitude to your name and family, by erecting a monument to him, who bled in the cause of freedom amongst them; to him, who dared to act *in opposition to a Court*, when his judgment informed him his opposition was right; and yet he died a soldier. Our passions were wrought upon at the election by the mention of his honoured name, in a paper which you may perhaps remember; and may I not mention it to you, with a wish that you may *follow* so amiable, so disinterested, so revered a character? I believe you have not even an enemy, who would impute *your refusing to go*, to want of courage; nay, your courage would be made more *conspicuous by the refusal*.

If you should resolve, *at all events, to go*, I don't wish you may fall, as many do; but *I cannot say I wish success to the undertaking*. These, Sir, are the sentiments of many here, as well as of

Nottingham,

Your obedient servant,

Feb. 10, 1775.

SAMUEL KIRK.

General HOWE to Mr. KIRK.

SIR,

I HAVE read your letter of the 10th, with so much the greater degree of concern, as I had flattered myself I had *removed all those prejudices you had entertained against me*, when I had the pleasure of being with you at the election. The rancour and malice of those who were not my friends at the election, fill me with astonishment at the instance you mention of their wishes for my fall in America.

My going thither was not my seeking. I was ordered, and could not refuse, without incurring the odious name of backwardness to serve my country in distress.—So contrary are *men's opinions here*, to some with you, that, instead of the grossest abuse, I have been *most highly complimented upon the occasion, by those who are even averse to the measures of Administration*.

Every man's private feelings ought to give way to the service of the Public at all times; but particularly, when of that *delicate nature* in which our affairs stand at present. Whatever opprobrious names I may be called at Nottingham, I am encouraged

couraged to say, that no such epithets will be put on it in *any other quarter*. I intreat you in particular, to suspend your judgment *in those matters, until the event proves me unworthy of your support*.

One word for America: You are deceived, if you suppose there are not *many loyal and peaceable subjects* in that country. I may safely assert, that the insurgents are very few, in comparison of the whole people.

There are certainly those who do not agree to a taxation from hence, but who do not wish to sever themselves from the supremacy of this country. This last set of men, I should hope, by their being relieved from *the grievance*, will most readily return to all due obedience to the laws.

With respect to *the few*, who, I am told, desire to separate themselves from the Mother Country, I trust, when they find they are not supported in their frantic ideas by the more moderate, which I have described, they will, from fear of punishment, subside to the laws.

With regard to trade, this country must now fix the foundation of its stability with America, by procuring a lasting obedience to our laws, without which it can never arrive at that permanency so absolutely requisite for the well being of this empire.

I am, SIR,

Your faithful and

obedient Servant,

Queen Street,
Feb. 21, 1775.

WILLIAM HOWE;

No. III.

A Letter from the Committee of Congress to the President, found among the Papers of HENRY LAURENS, Esq.

SIR, *Camp at Valley Forge, Feb. 12, 1778.*

WE had flattered ourselves, that, before this time, the pleasure of Congress would be made known to us, respecting the Quarter-master's department. We fear our letter upon this subject has miscarried, or the consideration of it yielded to other business. You will therefore pardon us, Sir, when we again solicit your attention to it, as *an object of the last importance*; on which not only the *future success* of your arms, but the *present existence* of your army, immediately depend. The influence of this office is so diffusive through every part of your military system, that neither the wisdom of arrangement, the spirit of enterprise, or favourable opportunity, will be of any avail, if this great wheel in the machine stops, or moves heavily. We find ourselves embarrassed in entering on this subject, lest a bare recital of facts should carry an imputation (which we do not intend) on those gentlemen who have lately conducted it. We are sensible,

sensible, great and just allowances are to be made for the peculiarity of their situation, and we are perhaps not fully acquainted with all their difficulties. It is our duty, Sir, to inform you it is not our intention to censure; and be assured, nothing but a sense of the obligation we are under, to postpone all other considerations *to the public safety*, could induce us to perform the unpleasing task.—We find, Sir, the property of the continent dispersed *over the whole country*; not an encampment, route of the army, or considerable road, but abounds with waggons, left to the mercy of the weather, and the will of the inhabitants; large quantity of intrenching tools have, in like manner, been left in various hands, under no other security that we can learn, than the honesty of those who have them in possession. Not less than 3000 spades and shovels, and the like number of tomahawks, have been lately discovered and collected in the vicinity of the camp, by an order from one of the general officers. In the same way, a quantity of tents and tent cloth, after having lain a whole summer in a farmer's barn, and unknown to the officer of the department, was lately discovered, and brought to camp by a special order from the General.—From these instances, we presume there may be many other stores yet unknown and uncollected, which require immediate care and attention.

When,

When, in compliance with the expectations of Congress, and the wishes of the country, the army was thrown into huts, instead of retiring to more distant and convenient quarters, the troops justly expected every comfort which the surrounding country could afford. Among these, a providential care in the *article of straw*, would probably have saved the lives of many of your brave soldiers, who have now paid the great debt of nature. *Unprovided with this, or materials to raise them from the cold and wet earth, sickness and mortality have spread through their quarters in an astonishing degree. Notwithstanding the diligence of the physicians and surgeons, of whom we hear no complaint, the sick and dead list has increased one-third in the last week's returns, which was one-third greater than the week preceding; and, from the present inclement weather, will probably increase in a much greater proportion.—Nothing, Sir, can equal their sufferings, except the patience and fortitude with which the faithful part of the army endure them. Those of a different character desert in considerable numbers.*

We must also observe, that a number of the troops have now some time been prepared for inoculation; but the operation must be delayed, for want of this and other necessaries within the providence of this department. We need not point out the fatal consequences of this delay *in forming a new army, or the preservation of this.*—Almost
every

every day furnishes instances of the small pox in the natural way. Hitherto such vigilance and care has been used, that the contagion has not spread; but surely it is highly incumbent upon us, if possible, to annihilate the danger.

We need not point out the effect this circumstance will have upon the new draughted troops, if not carefully guarded; they are too obvious to need enumeration. In conference with the Forage-master on this subject (which, though in appearance trivial, is really important), he acquainted us, that, though out of his line, he would have procured it, *if waggons could have been furnished him for that purpose.*

The want of *horses and waggons* for the *ordinary as well as extraordinary occasions of the army*, presses upon us, if possible, with equal force; almost every species of camp transportation is now performed *by men, who, without a murmur, patiently yoke themselves to little carriages of their own making, or load their wood and provisions on their backs.—Should the enemy, encouraged by the growing weakness of your troops, be led to make a successful impression upon your camp, your artillery would now undoubtedly fall into their hands, for want of horses to remove it.—But these are smaller and tolerable evils, when compared with the imminent danger of your troops, perishing with famine, or dispersing in search of food.* The Commissaries, in addition to their supplies of

live cattle, which are precarious, have found a quantity of pork in New Jersey, of which, *by a failure of waggons, not one barrel has reached the camp.*

The orders were given for that purpose as early as the 4th of January.—In yesterday's conference with the General, he informed us, that *some Brigades had been four days without meat ; and that even the common soldiers had been at his quarters to make known their wants.*—At present, Sir, there is not one gentleman of any rank in this department, though the duties of the office require a constant and unremitted attention. In whatever view, therefore, the object presents itself, we trust you will discern, that the most essential interests are connected with it. The season of preparation for next campaign, is passing swiftly away. Be assured, Sir, that its operations will be ineffectual, either *for offence or protection*, if an arrangement is not immediately made, and the *most vigorous exertions* used to procure the necessary supplies.—Permit us to say, that *a moment's time should not be lost* in placing a man of approved abilities and extensive capacity at the head of the department, who will restore it to some degree of regularity and order ; whose provident care will immediately relieve the present wants of the army, and extend itself to those which must be satisfied, before we can expect vigour, enterprise, or success.—When your Committee reflect upon the

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increased

Increased difficulties of procuring waggons, horses, tents, and the numerous train of articles dependent on this office, *without which your army cannot even move*; they feel the greatest anxiety, lest the *utmost skill, diligence, and address, will prove ineffectual to satisfy the growing demand*. All other considerations vanish before this object; and we most earnestly wish, Congress may be impressed in a proper degree *with its necessity and importance*.

A report has reached us, that Col. Lutterlogh is a candidate for the office of Quarter-master General; we have therefore been led to make some inquiry into his character and conduct.—We should be far from doing injustice to his abilities and experience in a subordinate line; but, exclusive of the danger of entrusting so confidential an office to a stranger, whose attachment to this country must be light and transient, and whose interest may be so easily distinguished from ours, we cannot find that he possesses talents or activity equal to this important office.—We find, in the course of the campaign, necessary tools and stores have often been wanting; important and seasonable movements of the army delayed; in some instances, wholly frustrated; and favourable opportunities lost, through the deficiencies of this department.—The rapid marches of our army, and unforeseen disasters which attended it during the summer season,

partly claim some allowances ; but that disorder and confusion prevail through the department, which requires some able hand to reform and reduce it to a certain and melancholy truth.

Unacquainted with the resolution of Congress with respect to General Schuyler, we have hesitated what further to propose. Time is so extremely precarious, that we are unwilling to lose a single unnecessary moment ; and have therefore been induced to extend our views to the disapprobation of this gentleman, and make some provision for that event. A character has presented itself, which, in a great degree, meets our approbation, judgment, and wishes.—We have opened the subject to him, and it is now under his consideration. When we are at liberty, we shall introduce him to your notice ; but delicacy forbids our doing it, until he has made up his mind on the subject, and given his consent to the nomination.—Another gentleman of extensive connexions, great activity, and comprehensive genius, but intirely in civil life, has also been proposed. As he is at a distance, we have not been able to consult him ; and are restrained, by similar motives of delicacy, from making his character and name a subject of discussion, without his consent.

By the time we are favoured with the determination respecting General Schuyler, and he should
not

(149)

not be approved, we hope to be able to announce both these gentlemen for your consideration.

We are, with the greatest regard and respect,

S I R,

Your most obedient, and

very humble servants,

(THE COMMITTEE.)

Signed FRA. DANA,

To the President of Congress,

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